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MODERNIZING INFORMED
CONSENT: EXPANDING THE
BOUNDARIES OF MATERIALITY
Nadia N. Sawicki*
Informed consent law's emphasis on the disclosure of purely
medical information-such as diagnosis, prognosis, and the risks and
benefits of various treatment alternatives-does not accurately reflect
modern understandings of how patients make medical decisions. Ex-
isting common law disclosure duties fail to capture a variety of non-
medical factors relevant to patients, including information about the
physician's personal characteristics; the cost of treatment; the social
and ethical implications of various health care interventions; and the
legal consequences associated with diagnosis and treatment. Although
there is a wealth of literature analyzing the merits of such disclosures
in a few narrow contexts, there is little broader discussion and no con-
sensus about whether the doctrine of informed consent should be ex-
panded to include information that may be relevant to patients but
falls outside the traditional scope of medical materiality. This Article
seeks to fill that gap.
I offer a normative argument for expanding the scope of in-
formed consent disclosure to include non-medical information that is
within the physician's knowledge and expertise when the information
would be material to a reasonable patient and its disclosure would not
violate public policy. This proposal would result in a set of disclosure
requirements quite different from the ones set by modern common
law and legislation. In many ways, the range of required disclosures
may become broader, particularly with respect to physician-specific
information about qualifications, health status, and financial conflicts
of interests. Some disclosures, however, that are currently required by
statute (or have been proposed by commentators) would fall outside
the scope of informed consent-most notably, information about
support resources available in the abortion context; about the social,
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ethical, and legal implications of treatment; and about health care
costs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of informed consent is now so firmly entrenched in
medical practice and legal theory that it is easy to forget how recent its
origins are. It was not until the early 1960s that most medical and legal
professionals began to recognize that malpractice liability could attach to
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a physician's failure to properly inform her patient of the risks and bene-
fits of proposed clinical treatment.'
In the past fifty years, however, little has changed. Certainly, physi-
cians have become far more sensitive to issues of patient autonomy;
greater attention is being paid to health literacy; and shared conversation
rather than one-sided disclosure is now considered the optimal model for
obtaining informed consent. But the substantive scope of clinicians' dis-
closure duties under the doctrine of informed consent has remained es-
sentially unchanged. With very few exceptions, disclosures in clinical
practice are limited to information that is considered material from a
purely medical perspective: the patient's diagnosis and prognosis, the na-
ture of the proposed treatment, the treatment's risks and benefits, and
any reasonable alternative treatments.2
It is time to reconsider the merits of this basic model.
Contemporary understandings of the nature of human decision-
making support the finding that patients choosing between various types
of medical treatment do so by considering many factors, not just the
physiological consequences of treatment. Most notably, a wealth of re-
cent literature about values-based decision-making and preference-
sensitive care demonstrates that many patients' medical decisions are
driven by personal preferences about risk taking, cost, the prevention of
suffering, and the value of extending life.3 And ethical theories of auton-
omy provide that patients ought to have the opportunity to make medi-
cal decisions with full awareness of their impact on their personal goals
and values.4
While debates about whether informed consent should incorporate
nonmedical facts that patients consider relevant have been taking place
for decades, these debates have not resulted in any large-scale changes in
medical practice or tort liability. The groundswell of managed care in the
late 1980s and 1990s, for example, triggered a nationwide discussion
about physicians' obligations to disclose the financial incentives guiding
their treatment decisions.' Prominent cases like Johnson v. Kokemoor,6
1. See generally RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF
INFORMED CONSENT 88-91 (1986); JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 59-80
(1984).
2. See infra Parts I.B, II.C.
3. The phrase "preference-sensitive care" was coined by John Wennberg, whose influential
research on practice variations led to the development of modern models of shared decision-making.
See generally John E. Wennberg, Unwarranted Variations in Healthcare Delivery: Implications for Ac-
ademic Medical Centres, 325(7370) BRIT. MED. J. 961 (2002) (demonstrating that many variations in
clinical practice "cannot be explained by type or severity of illness or by patient preferences"); see also
Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The Case for Shared Med-
ical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J. L. & MED. 429, 430-31 (2006) (discussing research on variability in
patient values and preferences, and the implications for medical practice).
4. King & Moulton, supra note 3, at 468.
5. See, e.g., Mark Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31 GA. L. REV. 511 (1997);
Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost Containment, 85
IOWA L. REV. 261,264 (1999); E. Haavi Morreim, Economic Disclosure and Economic Advocacy: New
Duties in the Medical Standard of Care, 12 J. LEGAL MED. 275 (1991); Susan M. Wolf, Toward a Sys-
temic Theory of Informed Consent in Managed Care, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 1631, 1635-38 (1999).
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Moore v. University of California,' and Estate of Behringer v. Princeton8
led to questions about whether a physician's personal characteristics-
whether her qualifications,9 financial interests in medical research,o or
HIV status"-ought to be disclosed as part of the informed consent pro-
cess.12 More recently, increased public awareness of the dramatic differ-
ences in the cost of medical treatment across various health care set-
tings" has led some commentators to suggest that patients cannot grant
truly informed consent without knowing the cost of their proposed
treatment.14
As a result of these debates, there is already a wealth of academic
literature analyzing the merits of requiring physicians to disclose their fi-
nancial conflicts of interests, their qualifications, their HIV status, and,
more recently, the price of treatment." Beyond these very narrow con-
texts, however, there is little discussion and no consensus about what
constitutes "materiality" in the law of informed consent more broadly, or
whether there is any justification for expanding the doctrine of informed
6. Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495,495 (Wis. 1996).
7. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479,485 (Cal. 1990).
8. Estate of Behringer v. Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d. 1251, 1254 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991).
9. See, e.g., Emmanuel 0. Iheukwumere, Doctor, Are You Experienced? The Relevance of Dis-
closure of Physician Experience to a Valid Informed Consent, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoLY 373,
374 (2002); Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in Informed Consent: Compar-
ing Physicians to Each Other, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1999); Richard J. Veerapen, Informed Consent:
Physician Inexperience is a Material Risk for Patients, 35 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 478,478 (2007); Richard
A. Heinemann, Note, Pushing the Limits of Informed Consent: Johnson v. Kokemoor and Physician-
Specific Disclosure, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 1079, 1080.
10. See, e.g., Joseph M. Healey, Jr. & Kara L. Dowling, Controlling Conflicts of Interest in the
Doctor-Patient Relationship: Lessons from Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 42
MERCER L. REv. 989, 990 (1991); Jeffrey A. Potts, Note, Moore v. Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia: Expanded Disclosure, Limited Property Rights, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 453, 453 (1992).
11. See, e.g., Michelle Wilcox DeBarge, The Performance of Invasive Procedures by HIV-
Infected Doctors: The Duty to Disclose Under the Informed Consent Doctrine, 25 CoNN. L. REV. 991,
993 (1993); Lawrence Gostin, HIV-Infected Physicians and the Practice of Seriously Invasive Proce-
dures, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 32 (1989); Theodore R. LeBlang, Obligations of HIV-
Infected Health Professionals to Inform Patients of their Serological Status: Evolving Theories of Liabil-
ity, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 317, 317 (1994).
12. See generally Mary Ann Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients from Their
Physicians, 55 U. PITTSBURGH L. REV. 291, 293-94 (1994); Marc D. Ginsberg, Informed Consent: No
Longer Just What the Doctor Ordered?: The Contributions of Medical Associations and Courts to a
More Patient Friendly Doctrine, 15 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & LAW 17,21 (2010).
13. Public attention was drawn to the high (and variable) costs of American medical care due to
a series of very high-profile articles published by the New York Times in 2013 and 2014 as part of a
series entitled Paying Till it Hurts, available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/health/paying-
till-it-hurts.html. See also Elisabeth Rosenthal, The Price for a Hip Replacement? Many Hospitals Are
Stumped, Research Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2013, at A21 (discussing research findings reported in
Jaime A. Rosenthal, et al., Availability of Consumer Prices from US Hospitals for a Common Surgical
Procedure, 173 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 427 (2013)).
14. See, e.g., Alicia Hall, Financial Side Effects: Why Patients Should be Informed of Costs,
HASTINGS CR. REP. 41, May-June 2014, at 41; Kevin R. Riggs & Peter Ubel, Overcoming Barriers to
Discussing Out-of-Pocket Costs With Patients, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 849 (2014); Peter A Ubel et
al., Full Disclosure-Out-of-Pocket Costs as Side Effects, 369 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1484, 1484 (2013);
Peter A. Ubel, Doctor, First Tell Me What It Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2013, at A25.
15. See references cited supra notes 5, 9-13.
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consent to include information that may be relevant to patients but falls
outside the traditional scope of medical materiality."
This Article begins, in Part II, by explaining the ethical and legal
theories that form the basis of the doctrine of informed consent and iden-
tifying the limited guidance provided by courts in defining materiality for
the purposes of informed consent. It demonstrates that common law has
traditionally limited the scope of disclosure to medically material facts,
but makes the normative argument that the ethical foundations of in-
formed consent doctrine (together with contemporary understandings of
patient decision-making) would support broader disclosure duties.
In Part III, the Article develops a descriptive taxonomy of nonmed-
ical disclosures that may be relevant to patient decision-making and have
been proposed-by litigants, policymakers, and scholars-as potentially
suitable for inclusion within the process of informed consent. These in-
clude not only disclosures about physicians' financial conflicts of interest,
personal risk factors, and cost of treatment, but also disclosures about
physicians' other personal characteristics, practice patterns, and consci-
entious commitments; about social and societal implications of treatment
(as with prenatal genetic testing); about risks to third parties (as in the
cases of organ donation, abortion, and vaccination); about privacy risks
(such as those associated with collection of genetic information and hu-
man tissue); and about government and third-party resources available to
assist patients (such as adoption resources and TANF assistance).
Part IV of the Article crafts a normative framework for expanding
the doctrine of materiality in informed consent. It recognizes that while
ethical theories of decisional autonomy would likely support broader dis-
closure duties, practical limitations restrict the feasibility of a significant
expansion. Moreover, while expanding disclosure obligations would like-
ly benefit patients, doing so might be unreasonable for the physicians
who bear the primary burden of identifying and sharing material non-
medical information, as well as the secondary burden of tort liability for
nondisclosure. This Part argues that the legal doctrine of informed con-
sent in clinical practice can and should be expanded to include some
nonmedical information, subject to the following limitations: the dis-
closed information must be material to the reasonable patient, within the
16. In 1995, after two state courts decided informed consent cases dealing with information ar-
guably outside the scope of medical materiality, Judith Daar wrote an influential article discussing the
potential expansion of the materiality doctrine. Judith F. Daar, Informed Consent: Defining Limits
Through Therapeutic Parameters, 16 WH=ITIER L. REv. 187, 193 (1995) (discussing the "therapeutic
limitation" on informed consent in light of Arato v. Avedon and Faya v. Almaraz). However, with the
exception of Daar's article, most other commentary examining the potential expansion of informed
consent on a larger scale has only addressed the disclosure of physician-specific information-not the
other categories of information identified in Part III of this Article. See, e.g., Bobinski, supra note 12,
at 357 (discussing statutory and common law disclosure duties relating to provider characteristics and
financial conflicts of interest); Ginsberg, supra note 12 (discussing expansion of informed consent doc-
trine to include physician-specific information); Twerski & Cohen, supra note 9, at 42 (discussing dis-
closure of information relating to physician qualifications).
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physician's knowledge and expertise, and its disclosure must not violate
public policy.
Required disclosures based on the physician-expertise standard
would include not only medical information about the proposed treat-
ment, but also some nonmedical information about the physician's own
characteristics (such as her experience, financial conflicts of interest,
health status, etc.); information about a treatment's medical impact on
third parties (in the case of surrogacy and organ donation, for example);
any specialized knowledge the physician might have about the real-world
implications of patient disability; as well as the cost of treatment in those
limited areas of medical practice where cost information is readily known
(like psychiatry and plastic surgery). However, many categories of in-
formation that some commentators believe ought to be disclosed will not
be captured by this expanded definition of materiality. Information
about the cost of treatment would be excluded, at least in most practice
areas; as would physician-specific disclosures that implicate privacy or
policy concerns; and information about the social, ethical, legal, and pri-
vacy implications of treatment. Some categories of disclosure that are
currently required by law-most notably, information about social and
financial support resources available to women seeking abortions-
would also be excluded.
We live in an era where patients' medical decisions are often driven
by factors that were not contemplated (or were simply not relevant)
when the doctrine of informed consent was first developed. To bring in-
formed consent law into the twenty-first century, we must re-evaluate the
undertheorized doctrine of materiality, and recognize that the ethical
principles of decisional autonomy that underlie informed consent de-
mand a broader understanding of materiality. In offering both a descrip-
tive taxonomy of nonmedically material disclosures as well as a norma-
tive proposal for expanding the doctrine of informed consent, this author
hopes to assist readers in interpreting existing legal precedent, and in set-
ting normative goals for future policymaking and clinical practice.
II. DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT AND
MATERIALITY
The ethical and legal doctrines of informed consent to medical
treatment arose in the mid-twentieth century, partly in response to grow-
ing patient dissatisfaction with the paternalistic standards of the medical
profession." As the medical community began to recognize the value of
17. See generally KATZ, supra note 1. Informed consent doctrine in the research ethics context
arose somewhat earlier than in the clinical context, but tracked it through the 1960s and 1970s. Discus-
sions about informed consent to human subjects research began in earnest as a result of the Nurem-
berg trials of 1945-1946; they then continued through Henry Beecher's 1966 article in the New Eng-
land Journal of Medicine about ethical violations in American research, the 1972 revelation of the
Tuskegee syphilis trials, and ultimately the Office of Human Subjects Research Protection's 1979 pub-
lication of the Belmont Report.
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patient autonomy and integrate conversations about patient choice into
the treatment process, American law followed suit. By the late 1960s and
early 1970s, most courts recognized the failure to obtain informed con-
sent as a form of medical negligence, and were willing to impose tort lia-
bility on physicians who breached this duty.18 In defining the scope of the
informed consent duty, courts uniformly concluded that physicians have
a legal obligation to inform patients of material information about a pro-
posed course of treatment, which includes its risks and benefits as well as
those of any alternative treatments.19
This common law standard for informed consent soon became en-
trenched in both legal doctrine and responsible medical practice. How-
ever, perhaps because there was such widespread consensus across juris-
dictions about the scope of required disclosures, neither courts nor com-
commentators devoted much attention to the question of whether the
materiality standard might be interpreted more broadly.
In this Part, I explain the ethical foundations of the doctrine of in-
formed consent, and provide a brief history of how this doctrine mani-
fested itself in early common law.
A. Ethical Foundations: Decisional Autonomy
The doctrine of informed consent is grounded in the ethical princi-
ple of patient autonomy.20 Patients have a right to control their own bod-
ies and to make free and unencumbered choices about the medical inter-
ventions imposed on their bodies. While the theory of decisional
autonomy is grounded in Kantian deontological values (the notion that
the exercise of autonomy is a good in and of itself, regardless of its con-
sequences), autonomous decision-making often has utilitarian benefits as
well-that is, allowing patients to make autonomous choices ultimately
promotes their welfare by leading to objectively better choices.21 Further-
ing autonomy requires recognizing the patient's subjective goals and val-
ues, and providing the patient with the information needed to make a
coherent decision in accordance with these goals and values.22
18. While the modem doctrine of informed consent is grounded in negligence principles, it orig-
inated as a cause of action for battery. See generally JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT:
LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 41-44 (2d ed. 2001); BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH
LAW 310-13 (2d ed. 2000).
19. See generally BERG ET AL., supra note 18; FURROW ET AL., supra note 18.
20. See generally TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 103-05, 117-20 (6th ed. 2008); BERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 22-24; GERALD DWORKIN, THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 100-20 (1988); FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 7-9.
21. DWORKIN, supra note 20, at 110-12 (discussing both intrinsic and utilitarian arguments for
autonomous medical decision-making).
22. See Tom L. Beauchamp, Autonomy and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 62 (Frankin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010) (recognizing that the principle of re-
spect for autonomy demands that we "respect an autonomous agent's right to control his or her affairs
in accordance with personal values and beliefs"); BERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 24 (noting that au-
tonomous and informed decision-making promotes subjective well-being); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF
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Autonomous decision-making requires the satisfaction of a variety
of conditions, including capacity, voluntariness, and factual understand-
ing.23 In the context of medical treatment, however, patients are often
unable to make informed choices because they lack the information nec-
essary to understand their options. Physician disclosure is thus a neces-
sary component for satisfying the conditions of autonomous decision-
making in medical care. 24 Beyond general reference to "materiality" or
"relevance," however, ethical theories of informed consent rarely pro-
vide specific guidance about the substantive information that ought to be
disclosed as part of the consent process.25 Indeed, medical ethicists fre-
quently criticize the law's emphasis on defining the substantive scope of
required disclosure; instead, they argue, the ethical duty to obtain in-
formed consent ought to be context specific, focusing on the patient's in-
dividualized needs and actual understanding rather than the physician's
satisfaction of rote disclosure requirements. 2 6 In framing the ideal in-
formed consent process as an ongoing process of shared decision-making
and conversation,2 7 medical ethicists recognize that there is no single dis-
closure standard that will suffice for all doctors and all patients.2 Thus,
they may see less need to delineate the specific boundaries of what ought
to be disclosed-at least as compared to attorneys and their clients, who
INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 42-43 (Oct. 1982) (noting the
importance of informed consent in achieving patients' subjective goals).
23. See generally BEAUCHAMP, supra note 20, at 120-21; BERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 65-70.
24. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 20, at 121-22.
25. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP, supra note 20, at 121 (noting that health care professionals must dis-
close "those facts or descriptions that patients or subjects usually consider material in deciding wheth-
er to refuse or consent to the proposed intervention or research" as well as "information the profes-
sional believes to be material"); FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 9 (noting that the question of
what kinds of information must be disclosed to facilitate autonomous decision-making "remain[s] un-
settled"); id. at 308 (identifying as "core disclosures" those facts that patients and health care profes-
sionals believe to be "material"). The American Medical Association's Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs' opinion on the requirements of informed consent is likewise vague; it requires the disclosure
of "all relevant medical information" but notes that "quantity and specificity of this information
should be tailored to meet the preferences and needs of individual patients." Opinion 8.08: Informed
Consent, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUD. AFFAIRS, AM. MED. Ass'N (last updated Nov. 2006) [here-
after AMA Opinion 8.08].
26. See, e.g., Beauchamp, supra note 22, at 57-58 ("Physicians who obtain consent under institu-
tional criteria can fail -and often do fail--to meet the more rigorous standards of an autonomy-
based model."); FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 305-08 (criticizing the disclosure standards of
informed consent law, and arguing that informed consent ought to focus on communication aimed at
achieving "substantial understanding," rather than relying simply on "core disclosures"); Steven Joffe
& Robert Truog, Consent to Medical Care: The Importance of Fiduciary Context, in THE ETHICS OF
CONSENT, supra note 22, at 367-69 (noting that a single set of disclosure standards may not be able to
satisfy both legal and ethical standards of informed consent). Some legal scholars share this concern as
well. See, e.g., Jay Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT. L REV 137, 173
(1977) (noting the impossibility of "promulgat[ing] an informed consent doctrine which articulates the
extent of communication required for all medical encounters"); Dayna Bowen Matthew, Race, Reli-
gion, and Informed Consent-Lessons from Social Science, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 150, 168 (2008)
(noting that "[t]he error of informed consent law has been in oversimplifying the complexity of the
relationship between physician and patient by regulating the disclosure rather than the relationship").
27. King & Moulton, supra note 3, at 429.
28. AMA Opinion 8.08, supra note 25 (noting the necessity of tailoring disclosure requirements
to individual patients).
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typically require greater clarity about substantive disclosure standards
and the boundaries of tort liability.
B. Legal Foundations: The Common Law Duty of Informed Consent
The modem legal doctrine of informed consent allows a patient who
suffers injury as a result of a medical procedure's undisclosed risks to re-
cover in tort from the physician who failed to adequately disclose those
risks. To prevail in a typical informed consent action, the patient must
demonstrate that (1) her physician breached a duty to disclose a material
risk associated with a medical procedure; (2) that the reasonable patient
would more likely than not have opted not to undergo the procedure had
she known of the undisclosed risk; (3) that the patient suffered a com-
pensable injury as a result of her decision; (4) and that the patient's inju-
ry was in fact caused by the undisclosed risk.29 The disputed issue in the
vast majority of informed consent cases-and the issue that legal schol-
ars debate with greatest intensity-is the substantive scope of the disclo-
sure duty. 0
The scope of the physician's duty varies depending on the jurisdic-
tion in which she practices. In the United States, jurisdictions are more or
less evenly divided between a patient-based standard and a physician-
based standard for identifying the information that must be disclosed as
part of the informed consent process.31
The physician-based standard, which was more prevalent in the ear-
ly history of informed consent, defines the scope of disclosure by refer-
ence to what a reasonable physician would customarily disclose.32 The
Kansas Supreme Court's 1960 decision in Natanson v. Kline (which is still
cited by courts today) held that a physician has a duty to "assure that an
informed consent of the patient is obtained," but this duty is limited to
"those disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner would make
under the same or similar circumstances."3 3
29. Patients may also bring informed consent cases associated with decisions not to pursue medi-
cal treatment or testing. For example, a patient who chooses not to undergo a Pap smear because her
physician failed to adequately disclose the risks of inaction may bring a tort suit if she suffers injury as
a result of the ill-informed decision. Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902 (Cal. 1980).
30. As Peter Schuck wrote, "Everyone, it seems, favors the principle of informed consent; it is
'only' the specific details and applications of the doctrine that arouse serious debate." Peter H. Schuck,
Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L. J. 899,902-03 (1994).
31. FURROW ET AL., supra note 18, at 314 (noting that "more than twenty-five states" have
adopted a physician-based standard, either by judicial decision or by statute, but that the patient-based
standard is now "approaching a majority position"); King & Moulton, supra note 3, at App. A. For a
more thorough explanation of the history of and distinction between the two standards, see BERG ET
AL., supra note 18, at 46-52; FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 30-34; FURROW ET AL., supra
note 18, at 313-14.
32. Under the physician-based standard, expert testimony is required to establish the scope of
required disclosures. See, e.g., Roberts v. Young, 119 N.w.2d 627, 629-30 (Mich. 1963); Hamilton v.
Bares, 678 N.W.2d 74, 79 (Neb. 2004); Aronson v. Harriman, 901 S.W.2d 832, 838 (Ark. 1995); Roark
v. Allen, 633 S.w.2d 804, 809 (Tex. 1982).
33. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan.), decision clarified on denial ofreh'g, 354 P.2d
670 (Kan. 1960).
No. 3] 829
830 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2016
The physician-based standard has been widely criticized on the
grounds that it does not accurately reflect the autonomy-based principles
underlying the doctrine of informed consent. In Canterbury v. Spence,
perhaps the most broadly-cited informed consent case in American juris-
prudence, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
rejected the physician-based standard, noting that the "root premise" of
informed consent doctrine is "the concept, fundamental in American ju-
risprudence, that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind
has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body. . . ."34 Ac-
cordingly, the court held, it is "the patient's right of self-decision [that]
shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal.""
Under the patient-based standard established in Canterbury and
adopted by numerous courts since then, the scope of the disclosure duty
is defined by reference to the reasonable patient's needs and expecta-
tions. Key to the patient-based standard of disclosure is the question of
what information a reasonable patient would find "material." 6 Accord-
ing to the court in Canterbury, a risk qualifies as material when a "rea-
sonable person ... would be likely to attach significance to the risk or
cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed thera-
py." 37 This definition of materiality has been widely adopted."
34. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (citing Schloendorff v. Soc'y of
N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)).
35. Id. at 786-87; see also Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504, 508-09 (N.J. 1988) (identifying as
one of the reasons for rejecting the physician-based standard "the notion that the physician's duty of
disclosure 'arises from phenomena apart from medical custom and practice': the patient's right of self-
determination"); Wheeldon v. Madison, 374 N.W.2d 367, 374 (S.D. 1985) (holding that "the right to
know-to be informed--is a fundamental right personal to the patient and should not be subject to
restriction by medical practices that may be at odds with the patient's informational needs"); Cross v.
Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446, 455 (W. Va. 1982) (holding that liability under the patient-based standard de-
pends on "the reasonableness of the physician's disclosure or nondisclosure in terms of what the physi-
cian knows or should know to be the patient's informational needs"); Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014,
1021 (Md. 1977) (holding that "protection of the patient's fundamental right of physical self-
determination [is] the very cornerstone of the informed consent doctrine [and] mandates that the
scope of a physician's duty to disclose therapeutic risks and alternatives be governed by the patient's
informational needs").
36. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786-87 (holding that physicians have a common law duty to disclose
all risks "material to the [patient's] decision"); Wheeldon, 374 N.W.2d at 375 ("Materiality, therefore,
is the cornerstone upon which the physician's duty to disclose is based."); FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, su-
pra note 1, at 32 (referring to materiality as the "legal litmus test" for determining extent of disclosure
under the reasonable patient standard); Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, Informed Consent
to Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 628, 637 (1969) (describing materiality as the "traditional legal litmus
for measuring the significance of information in decision-making").
37. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786-87 (citation omitted).
38. See, e.g., Sard, 379 A.2d at 1022 ("A material risk is one which a physician knows or ought to
know would be significant to a reasonable person in the patient's position in deciding whether or not
to submit to a particular medical treatment or procedure."); Wheeldon, 374 N.W.2d at 371 ("Material
information is information which the physician knows or should know would be regarded as significant
by a reasonable person in the patient's position when deciding to accept or reject a recommended
medical procedure."); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (R.I. 1972) (citation omitted) ("Material-
ity may be said to be the significance a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should know
is his patient's position, would attach to the disclosed risk or risks in deciding whether to submit or not
to submit to surgery or treatment.").
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While the determination of what information counts as "material" is
ultimately one for the jury,39 most courts adopting the patient-based
standard have identified a set of disclosures they consider essential for an
informed decision. This includes substantive information about the pa-
tient's diagnosis and proposed treatment; the treatment's risks and bene-
fits; alternative procedures and their risks and benefits; and the risks and
benefits of taking no action (hereafter referred to as the "standard risk-
and-benefit disclosure").40 Interestingly, although physician-based juris-
dictions reject the idea that the scope of disclosure should be guided by
the patients' informational needs, states that retain the physician-based
standard rely on the same set of standard risk-and-benefit disclosures
when framing the issue of physician liability.41 Most statutory codifica-
tions of informed consent requirements use similar language, although
they vary in their specificity.42
39. Downs v. Trias, 49 A.3d 180, 186 (Conn. 2012); Smith v. Weaver, 407 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Neb.
1987); Wilkinson, 295 A.2d at 688.
40. See, e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787-88 ("The topics importantly demanding a communica-
tion of information are the inherent and potential hazards of the proposed treatment, the alternatives
to that treatment, if any, and the results likely if the patient remains untreated."); Duffy v. Flagg, 905
A.2d 15, 20 (Conn. 2006) (adopting the patient-based standard, and requiring disclosure of "(1) the
nature of the procedure; (2) the risks and hazards of the procedure; (3) the alternatives to the proce-
dure; and (4) the anticipated benefits of the procedure"); Sard, 379 A.2d at 1020 ("This duty to dis-
close is said to require a physician to reveal to his patient the nature of the ailment, the nature of the
proposed treatment, the probability of success of the contemplated therapy and its alternatives, and
the risk of unfortunate consequences associated with such treatment."); Howard v. Univ. of Med. &
Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 79 (N.J. 2002) (adopting the reasonably prudent patient standard, and
requiring disclosure of "information concerning the risks of the procedure or treatment, the alterna-
tives, or the potential results if the procedure or treatment were not undertaken"); Wheeldon, 374
N.W.2d at 375 ("[W]e deem a reasonable disclosure to be one which apprises the patient of all known
material or significant risks inherent in a prescribed medical procedure, as well as the availability of
any reasonable alternative treatment or procedures."); Cross, 294 S.E.2d at 455 (adopting the patient-
based standard, and identifying the following as material facts: "(1) the possibility of the surgery,
(2) the risks involved concerning the surgery, (3) alternative methods of treatment, (4) the risks relat-
ing to such alternative methods of treatment and (5) the results likely to occur if the patient remains
untreated").
41. See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan.), decision clarified on denial of reh'g,
354 P.2d 670 (Kan. 1960) (establishing a physician-based standard of disclosure, and identifying re-
quired disclosures as "the nature of the ailment, the nature of the proposed treatment, the probability
of success or of alternatives, and perhaps the risks of unfortunate results and unforeseen conditions
within the body"); Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 732 (Tenn. 1998) (holding that the scope of the
disclosure duty depends on "the usual and customary advice given to patients to procure consent in
similar situations" and requiring specific disclosure of "the diagnosis or nature of the patient's ailment,
the nature of and the reasons for the proposed treatment or procedure, the risks or dangers involved,
and the prospects for success," as well as "alternative methods of treatment, the risks and benefits of
such treatment and, if applicable, that the proposed treatment or procedure is experimental").
42. Compare, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1 (1981) (requiring disclosure of (1) diagnosis,
(2) the proposed procedure's "nature and purpose," (3) the material risks of "infection, allergic reac-
tion, severe loss of blood, loss or loss of function of any limb or organ, paralysis or partial paralysis,
paraplegia or quadriplegia, disfiguring scar, brain damage, cardiac arrest, or death"; (4) the proce-
dure's likelihood of success; (5) alternative treatments; (6) prognosis if the proposed treatment is re-
jected); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 1975) (requiring disclosure of "alternatives" and
"reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits"); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504 (West 2015) (requir-
ing "a description of a procedure" as well as disclosure of "risks and alternatives"); TEx. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. §§ 74.101, 74.104 (West 2015) (requiring disclosure of the "risks or hazards" in-
volved in a procedure). Note that legislatures have also established more specific disclosure and con-
sent requirements for particular procedures.
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It is worth noting, however, that a minority of courts and legisla-
tures interpret the informed consent disclosure duty more narrowly. Re-
lying on Canterbury v. Spence's language about "the inherent and poten-
tial hazards of the proposed treatment,"43 some courts limit informed
consent disclosure to the purely medical or physiological risks and bene-
fits inherent in a procedure. Such courts have rejected tort claims alleg-
ing physician nondisclosure of the method by which a procedure is per-
formed (on the grounds that this does not constitute a risk)," as well as
nondisclosure of the risk of provider negligence (on the grounds that this
risk is not "inherent in the procedure").45 Some courts and legislatures
have narrowed the disclosure duty even further, limiting the types of
procedures for which informed consent is required,4 6 or identifying a
more limited set of risks that need to be disclosed.47
43. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787.
44. See, e.g., Valles v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 805 A.2d 1232, 1240 (Pa. 2002) (holding that
"the manner or method in which the surgeon performs the proposed procedure is not encompassed
within the purview of the informed consent doctrine"); Tajchman v. Giller, 938 S.W.2d 95, 98-99 (Tex.
App. 1996) (holding that Texas' informed consent statute did not require disclosure of the particular
steps involved in a procedure, only the "risks or hazards" associated with the procedure).
45. See, e.g., Mallett v. Pirkey, 466 P.2d 466,470 (Colo. 1970) ("A doctor does not have a duty to
disclose the risks of the improper performance of an appropriate procedure."); Mull v. Emory Univ.,
150 S.E.2d 276, 292 (Ga. 1966) (holding that the informed consent rule "applies only to the duty to
warn of the hazards of a correct and proper procedure of diagnosis or treatment, and has no relation
to the failure to inform of the hazards of an improper procedure"); Gilmartin v. Weinreb, 735 A.2d
620, 627 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Civ. 1999) (holding that advising a patient "of the general risk of negli-
gence ... is inadequate to the purposes of the informed consent rule" in a case where medication was
negligently administered at a higher dose than indicated); Felton v. Lovett, 388 S.W.3d 656, 662 (Tex.
2012) (defining the "[i]nherent risks of treatment" as those "which are directly related to the treatment
and occur without negligence," excluding information about "eventualities or non-treatment-specific
injuries, such as the possibility of hospital infections, or complications which occur without particular
regard to the treatment the patient receives."); Binur v. Jacobo, 135 S.W.3d 646, 655 (Tex. 2004) (hold-
ing that "failing to disclose that a diagnosis or prognosis may be or is erroneous when that diagnosis or
prognosis supports a recommendation to undergo a surgical procedure is not a risk that is 'inherent to'
and 'inseparable from' the surgical procedure itself").
46. See, e.g., Morgan v. MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617, 619 (Pa. 1997) (limiting informed consent liabil-
ity to "surgical or operative" procedures); Sinclair ex reL Sinclair v. Block, 633 A.2d 1137, 1140 (Pa.
1993) (denying patient's informed consent claim where forceps were used to facilitate delivery, on the
grounds that such did not constitute a "surgical or operative procedure" subject to informed consent
requirements); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 939 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (limiting informed
consent liability to cases involving "some affirmative violation of the patient's physical integrity such
as surgical procedures, injections or invasive diagnostic tests"). Courts in states like Pennsylvania and
Louisiana have found that physicians cannot be sued for breach of informed consent when they fail to
provide information in connection with setting a broken bone, administering a flu shot, performing a
blood test, performing a blood transfusion, administering radiation treatment, performing chiropractic
manipulation, administering IV drugs, and treating a patient post-operatively eye drops. Most states
justifiably reject this limitation, however. As explained by the New Jersey Supreme Court, "The criti-
cal consideration is not the invasiveness of the procedure, but the patient's need for information to
make a reasonable decision about the appropriate course of medical treatment, whether invasive or
noninvasive." Matthies v. Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 456,464 (N.J. 1999).
47. For example, Iowa and Louisiana's informed consent statutes limit required disclosures to
"the known risks, if any, of death, brain damage, quadriplegia, paraplegia, the loss or loss of function
of any organ or limb, of disfiguring scars associated with such procedure or procedures." IOWA CODE §
147.137 (1975); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.39.5 (West 2015) (upheld in LaCaze v. Collier, 416 So.
2d 619, 622 (La. Ct. App.), writ granted, 420 So. 2d 440 (La. 1982), affd, 434 So. 2d 1039 (La. 1983));
see also GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1 (1988) (limiting disclosure to the material risks of "infection, aller-
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C. Understanding Materiality in Informed Consent
Perhaps because there has been widespread agreement since the
1960s that the standard risk-and-benefit disclosure satisfies both the pa-
tient-based and physician-based standards of informed consent, there has
been little comprehensive discussion of what materiality to patient deci-
sion-making means in a broader sense. As recognized by many commen-
tators, legal definitions of "materiality" in the context of informed con-
sent tend to be somewhat vague." The few courts that have attempted to
provide a definition have held that material facts are those that a reason-
able patient would find "significant" in making a medical decision.49 And
with the exception of cases analyzing the therapeutic privilege, no court
has considered the secondary question of whether informed consent re-
quires disclosure of all facts a patient would consider material, or wheth-
er policy considerations or other factors might limit legally required dis-
closures to only some material facts.
It is problematic that the concept of materiality has, to date, been so
undertheorized. While most courts and commentators have historically
agreed that that the physician's legal duty of disclosure only pertains to
medical facts (under the standard risk-and-benefit disclosure), lay defini-
tions of materiality-and understandings of materiality from an ethical
perspective-are far broader.
1. Medical Materiality: Common Law Limitations
Legal scholars interpreting the common law history of informed
consent have concluded that, with very rare exceptions,"o the physician's
duty only extends to disclosure of medically material facts--not other
types of information that may nevertheless be relevant to a patient's
choice.51 William McNichols describes cases about the withholding of
nonmedical "collateral" information as "[a]t the boundary of the theory"
of informed consent.5 2 Similarly, Judith Daar (while ultimately arguing
gic reaction, severe loss of blood, loss or loss of function of any limb or organ, paralysis or partial pa-
ralysis, paraplegia or quadriplegia, disfiguring scar, brain damage, cardiac arrest, or death").
48. BERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 64-65 (noting a "lack of clear definition of the scope" of re-
quired informed consent disclosure); Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 36, at 638 (noting that in-
formed consent case law "ha[s] not clearly articulated standards of materiality"). According to some
commentators, "the law can tolerate a vague definition of materiality" because of the strict causation
requirements for informed consent cases-that is, the success or failure of an informed consent action
depends on whether the plaintiff demonstrated that a reasonable patient in her position would have
made a different decision had she been properly informed. Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski,
Uncertainty and Informed Choice: Unmasking Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257, 275 (2005). As noted
in Part IV.D, however, these two issues are intertwined.
49. See supra notes 36-38.
50. Most notably, required disclosures of some financial conflicts of interest. See infra Part
III.A.2.
51. See generally Marjorie M. Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected
Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 284-85 (1985).
52. William J. McNichols, Informed Consent Liability in a Material Information Jurisdiction:
What Does the Future Portend, 48 OKLA. L. REv. 711, 713 (1995).
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for a more nuanced view of disclosure obligations) describes cases in-
volving disclosure of nonmedical information as reaching "beyond tradi-
tional doctrine requiring disclosure of treatment risks and alternatives.""
She describes this "therapeutic limitation" on informed consent disclo-
sure as effectively "tell[ing] physicians that they need not look beyond
the medical needs of their patients in disclosing information about treat-
ment. The physician need not be concerned with his patient as an inves-
tor, a business manager, a father, or a spouse."" These interpretations
are consistent with the practice of medical professionals and their under-
standing of their ethical obligations. The American Medical Associa-
tion's ethical guidance on informed consent, for example, describes the
physician's obligation as "present[ing] the medical facts ... and mak[ing]
[medical] recommendations," and does not speak to other facts the phy-
sician might disclose."
2. Broader Lay Understandings of Materiality
It is widely understood that a variety of different factors can affect
patient decision-making. Medically material facts, such as information
about the medical efficacy of a procedure and its likelihood of improving
the patient's physiological well-being ("Will this procedure be successful
in easing my symptoms?"), are obviously essential to a patient's decision.
However, a patient choosing to pursue one avenue of treatment may
have a variety of different reasons for doing so, some of them falling out-
side the scope of medical fact. "How much will this procedure cost? How
will I feel about my body after this procedure? Will I be subject to dis-
crimination after this treatment? Does the hospital look like a luxury ho-
tel? Do I trust my doctor?" A patient's choice of whether to undergo a
procedure (or where or by whom to have the procedure) may change de-
pending on the answers to any of these questions. As noted by Judith
Daar, "the realities of human decision-making will inevitably blur [the]
line [between medical and nonmedical interests]."1 6 Moreover, the Insti-
tute of Medicine has recently recognized that nonmedical facts about the
social determinants of a patient's health (such as their financial re-
sources, housing situation, education, and social support) are essential
for effective diagnosis and treatment."
The principles of decisional autonomy that underlie both the ethical
and legal doctrines of informed consent, furthermore, support a broader
interpretation of materiality. If the goal of autonomous choice in the
medical context is decision-making in accordance with a patient's per-
53. Daar, supra note 16, at 188-89.
54. Id. at 195.
55. AMA Opinion 8.08, supra note 25.
56. Daar, supra note 16, at 196; see also BERG, supra note 18, at 179 ("[T]o encourage patients'
reflections on what selection of a course of treatment is likely to mean to their lives, physicians may
have to go beyond the narrow requirements of the law.").
57. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACAD., CAPTURING SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL DOMAINS AND
MEASURES IN ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS 8 (2014).
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sonal goals and values, then nonmedical factors are surely material under
a lay definition." And the breadth of debate about the possible expan-
sion of informed consent in the contexts mentioned in Part III provides
further support for the idea that materiality might reasonably be inter-
preted to include nonmedical information.
3. Relevance of Materiality Regardless of Jurisdiction
Understanding what type of information is material to patient deci-
sion-making is important regardless of whether a jurisdiction adopts a
physician-based, patient-based, or mixed standard of care. While only
those jurisdictions adopting a patient-based standard of disclosure explic-
itly look to materiality to define the contours of informed consent, pa-
tient-centered language about the "facts ... necessary to form the basis
of an intelligent consent by the patient" is prevalent even in physician-
based jurisdictions. 9
Modern scholars recognize that the while the distinction between
patient- and provider-based disclosure standards may be helpful as a
theoretical matter, "in practice the boundary between these two stand-
ards is often blurred."" Many courts, while purporting to adopt a single
standard, often adopt something closer to a mixed model, incorporating
aspects of physicians' usual practices while at the same time recognizing
the importance of the patient's informational needs.61 For example, the
decision of the Kansas Supreme Court in Natanson v. Kline is widely cit-
ed as an example of the physician-based standard; there, the court
framed the liability issue in terms of whether the physician's disclosures
were "in accordance with that of a reasonable medical practitioner would
make under the same or similar circumstances."62 However, the court al-
so emphasized that the physician's duty includes a duty to disclose "sig-
nificant facts within [the physician's] knowledge which are necessary to
form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed
form of treatment," a determination which necessarily relies on the pa-
tient's needs and expectations. 63 Other courts are more explicit in recog-
nizing that both professional standards and patient expectations are rele-
58. See Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504, 508-09 (N.J. 1988) (arguing that "that the physician's
duty of disclosure 'arises from phenomena apart from medical custom and practice': the patient's right
of self-determination," which defines "the direction in which [the patient's] interests seem to lie").
59. Natanson v. Kline, 354 P.2d 670, 672-73 (Kan. 1960).
60. BERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 51.
61. Id. at 51-52.
62. Natanson, 354 P.2d at 673.
63. Id. at 672-73 (emphasis added); see also ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Med. Ctr., 499 P.2d 1, 10
(Wash. 1972) (holding that informed consent requires disclosure of "information which a reasonably
prudent physician or medical specialist of that medical community should or would know to be essen-
tial to enable a patient of ordinary understanding to intelligently decide whether to incur the risk by
accepting the proposed treatment or avoid that risk by foregoing it"); Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr.
Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, at 181 (Cal. App. 1957) (defining the informed consent obligation as
the duty to disclose "any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the
patient to the proposed treatment," but recognizing the need for physician discretion in determining
the precise contours of disclosure).
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vant to determining the scope of disclosure. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., for example, held that
"[t]he disclosures which would be made by doctors of good standing, un-
der the same or similar circumstances, are certainly relevant and material
and we surmise would be adequate to fulfill the doctor's duty of disclo-
sure in most instances," but emphasized that "the duty to disclose or in-
form cannot be summarily limited to a professional standard that may be
nonexistent or inadequate to meet the informational needs of a pa-
tient."'
Moreover, many courts that purport to adopt a physician-based
standard have arguably done so on the basis of a misinterpretation of the
foundational physician-standard cases. The earliest cases that relied on
professional custom to define the duties of disclosure did so in an era
when physicians would regularly shield patients from troubling infor-
mation (such as a cancer diagnosis) on the basis of the "therapeutic privi-
lege"-the idea that sometimes, disclosure of medical facts may do more
harm than good for some patients prone to emotional trauma." In Salgo
v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, for example, the disputed
jury instruction established a patient-based standard: "A physician vio-
lates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability if he with-
holds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent
consent by the patient to the proposed treatment."' The court, however,
noted that disclosure of all risks might be dangerous in light of "the pa-
tient's mental and emotional condition," and that therefore a "certain
amount of discretion must be employed consistent with the full disclo-
sure of facts necessary to an informed consent."" The court ordered that
the jury instruction be modified to reflect that "the physician has such
discretion consistent, of course, with the full disclosure of facts necessary
to an informed consent."6
The fact that a physician maintains discretion to limit the scope of
disclosure in exceptional circumstances by no means establishes a physi-
cian-custom-based standard of care. A better interpretation, and one
recognized more explicitly in recent cases," is that while the scope of dis-
64. Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 647,653 (Wisc. 1975); see also Winkjer
v. Herr, 277 N.W.2d 579, 587-88 (N.D. 1979) (holding that even if a physician's "disclosure conforms to
accepted medical practice," expert testimony about medical practice "does not define the legal duty to
inform which exists as a matter of law" and requiring the physician to "inform the patient of a signifi-
cant risk of treatment or of an alternative treatment").
65. See generally FURROW ET AL., supra note 18, at 336-37.
66. Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Carr v. Strode, 904 P.2d 489, 500 (Haw. 1995) (adopting the patient-based standard,
but recognizing that expert testimony may be necessary "where privileges are asserted, as to the exist-
ence of any emergency claimed and the nature and seriousness of any impact upon the patient from
risk-disclosure"); Bernard v. Char, 903 P.2d 676, 686-87 (Haw. Ct. App.), affd, 903 P.2d 667 (Haw.
1995) (saying that proponents of the physician-based standard recommend it on the basis that "only a
physician is capable of estimating the potential psychological impact that risk disclosure would have on
a particular patient"; finding that "the application of the physician standard in nondisclosure cases
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closure depends on those facts necessary for a patient to make an in-
formed judgment (from the patient's perspective), the therapeutic privi-
lege allows physicians to limit disclosure if in their professional opinion
such disclosure would be detrimental to the patient.
Thus, questions about what types of information are relevant to pa-
tient decision-making are important regardless of jurisdictional differ-
ences in determining the standard of care for disclosure.7 0
III. EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF MATERIALITY
The common law informed consent standards established in the
1960s and 1970s still, for the most part, define the scope of physician lia-
bility. Courts continue to hold that physicians have a duty to disclose in-
formation material to a patient's medical decision-making-including
the patient's diagnosis and prognosis, the risks and benefits of the rec-
ommended treatment, and the risks and benefits of any alternative
treatments.
Today, however, it is increasingly obvious that what counts as "ma-
terial" information for the average patient may not captured by the
common law disclosure duty. A patient choosing whether or not to go
forward with a medical intervention may base her decision on a variety
of nonmedical factors, including information about the physician, his dis-
ease status, experience, and conflicts of interest; the cost of treatment; or
the social or legal implications of treatment.
This Part categorizes the types of nonmedical information that pa-
tients might reasonably consider relevant to their medical decisions (and
therefore suitable for discussion as part of the informed consent conver-
sation). Some of these categories have already been thoroughly explored
in the literature, while others are of more recent vintage, proposed in re-
sponse to changes in the modern health care climate. Whether suggested
by policymakers, patient advocates, or academic commentators, these
expanded understandings of what constitutes material information, if
widely adopted, would revolutionize the doctrine of informed consent.
based on the therapeutic privilege exception and the patient standard in cases where the duty of dis-
closure clearly applies is consistent with the underlying foundation upon which the doctrine of in-
formed consent is premised").
70. It is also worth noting that even in jurisdictions that adopt a physician-based standard, courts
still need to evaluate materiality for the purposes of causation. The causation standard for an informed
consent suit (regardless of jurisdictional definitions of scope of duty) typically requires a patient to
prove that a reasonable patient would have opted for a different medical course of action had the phy-
sician satisfied her duty to disclosure. The patient needs to demonstrate that the undisclosed fact
would have been material to the reasonable patient---that is, that the reasonable patient would have
been likely to attach significance to the fact to such a degree that it would more likely than not have
affected her decision. Note, however, that four states use a subjective, rather than an objective, stand-
ard for causation. Evelyn M. Tenenbaum, Revitalizing Informed Consent and Protecting Patient Au-
tonomy: An Appeal to Abandon Objective Causation, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 697, 716-17 (2011).
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A. Provider-Specific Characteristics
Every health care provider is an individual with unique characteris-
tics; patients choosing between providers recognize this fact. The average
patient might choose a treating physician based on her gender,7 1 her eth-
nicity, her age, the university from which she graduated, her reputation
in the community, or any number of other factors. Likewise, a patient
deciding between multiple treatment options might consider information
about the physician's degree of skill with these treatments (particularly in
the context of surgery), her success rates, and her motivations for rec-
ommending one treatment over another.
The number of prominent lawsuits filed by patients claiming to have
suffered injury as a result of not having access to provider-specific infor-
mation is proof that patients consider such information material to their
health care decisions. But with few exceptions, American courts have not
recognized provider-specific disclosures as integral to the common law of
informed consent. While their justifications vary, most courts ground
their decisions in the principle that because "material information" is
limited to information about the risks of a particular medical procedure,
information about a provider's personal characteristics does not fall with-
in the scope of materiality.7 2
1. Physician Experience and Qualifications
One of the few cases requiring disclosure of provider-specific risk
information is Johnson v. Kokernoor, in which a patient who was ren-
dered quadriplegic after surgery brought an informed consent claim on
the grounds that her physician "failed. . . to divulge the extent of his ex-
perience in performing this type of operation."7 The jury found for the
patient after the trial court admitted evidence that Dr. Kokemoor failed
to accurately disclose how often he had performed basilar bifurcation
aneurysm surgery, and that he did not discuss the comparative risks of
having such a surgery performed by a relatively inexperienced surgeon. 7 4
The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision, holding
that "a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would have consid-
ered such information material in making an intelligent and informed de-
cision about the surgery."7 ' The court emphasized that Wisconsin's in-
formed consent law requires disclosure of "all of the viable [treatment]
71. See, e.g., Cohen v. Smith, 648 N.E.2d 329, 331-32 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (recognizing that pa-
tient brought suit for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress when she consented to a
cesarean section with the restriction that she would not be seen unclothed by a male).
72. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
73. Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 497 (Wis. 1996). The plaintiff in Kokemoor testified
that she asked Dr. Kokemoor a direct question about his experience, to which he gave an allegedly
misleading response. However, because the plaintiff framed her claim as one grounded in failure of
informed consent rather than negligent misrepresentation, the Wisconsin court analyzed it by refer-
ence to affirmative disclosure obligations under the law of informed consent. Id. at 504 & n.29.
74. Id. at 497.
75. Id. at 505.
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alternatives," and framed the issue of physician experience as relevant to
the patient's evaluation of alternative treatments.7 6
A handful of courts in other states have also held that information
about a provider's credentials or experience with a given procedure may
need to be disclosed, particularly where those facts suggest there might
be an increased risk of injury." While most courts are unwilling to im-
pose an affirmative duty of disclosure of provider qualifications, some
have held that providers who misrepresent their credentials in response
to patient inquiries might nonetheless be liable under the doctrine of in-
formed consent.7 1 In Howard v. University of Medicine and Dentistry of
New Jersey, for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that
''personal credentials and experience may not be a required part of an
informed consent disclosure under the current standard of care" because
that information does not directly relate to the procedure itself.79 Never-
theless, it held that where a physician actively misrepresents his qualifica-
tions, and those qualifications in fact substantially increase the risk of the
injury the patient suffered, the patient may have a claim based on in-
formed consent.'
The vast majority of courts, however, reject the notion that in-
formed consent requires affirmative disclosure of physician experience or
qualifications on the grounds that only information about the proposed
76. Id. at 498.
77. DeGenarro v. Tandon, 873 A.2d 191,200 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (holding that provider's lack
of experience with the dental equipment used on the patient must be disclosed if it adds to the risk of
the patient's procedure); see also Barriocanal v. Gibbs, 697 A.2d 1169, 1172 (Del. 1997) (holding that
the trial court erred in excluding evidence the physician's failure to inform his patient of his lack of
recent aneurysm surgery, and of the option of having the surgery at a teaching hospital instead); Gold-
berg v. Boone, 912 A.2d 698, 717 (Md. 2006) (holding that it was an issue for the jury to determine
whether the availability of a more experienced surgeon was material for the purposes of informed con-
sent); cf Wlosinski v. Cohn, 713 N.W. 2d 16, 20 & n.1 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (rejecting an expanded
disclosure duty in a case of prior transplant failures, but limiting its holding to "statistical data regard-
ing past treatment and other background information that has no concrete bearing on the actual risks
of a given procedure"); Housel v. James, 172 P.3d 712, 716 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (affirming trial
courts' finding that evidence of a physician's experience was not a material fact for the purposes of
informed consent, but refusing to "categorically hold[] that a physician's inexperience is never material
to an informed consent claim"); Prissel v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wisc., 674 N.W.2d 680 (Wis. Ct. App.
2003) (unpublished table decision) (affirming trial court's exclusion of evidence about physician's ex-
perience and disciplinary history where there was no evidence to suggest that such history posed an
increased risk of harm).
78. Willis v. Bender, 596 F.3d 1244, 1260 (10th Cir. 2010) (predicting that "the Wyoming Su-
preme Court would allow an informed consent claim where a physician lies to a patient as to physi-
cian-specific information in direct response to a patient's questions concerning the same in the course
of obtaining the patient's consent and the questions seek concrete verifiable facts, not the doctor's
subjective opinion or judgment as to the quality of his performance or abilities." (internal emphasis
omitted)); Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 83-84 (N.J. 2002) (discussed
herein); see also Paulos v. Johnson, 597 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that the physi-
cian's misrepresentation while obtaining patient's consent to surgery that he was board-certified in
response to patient's question presents "a pure informed consent issue" subject to a two-year statute
of limitations).
79. Howard, 800 A.2d at 83-84.
80. Id. at 84 ("If defendant's true level of experience had the capacity to enhance substantially
the risk of paralysis from undergoing a corpectomy, a jury could find that a reasonably prudent patient
would not have consented to that procedure had the misrepresentation been revealed.").
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treatment itself qualifies as material." In Whiteside v. Lukson, for exam-
ple, a Washington appellate court held that the state's informed consent
statute requires disclosure only of "treatment-related facts, expressly ex-
cluding the physician's qualifications." 82 The court justified its refusal to
expand the doctrine by citing the potentially significant burdens of dis-
closure on physicians-imposing a broader duty, according to the court,
might require disclosure of "the physician's own health, financial situa-
tion, even medical school grades."83
Finally, some courts have gone even further in maintaining a narrow
view of disclosure duties, holding that even in cases where physicians ac-
tively misrepresent their experience, no informed consent action will lie.
For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Duttry v. Patterson
held that information about a surgeon's personal qualifications and expe-
rience is not material for the purposes of informed consent, even if the
patient specifically requested this information and was misled.84 The
court justified its holding on the grounds that the materiality of the in-
formation "does not shift depending on how inquisitive or passive the
particular patient is."" Duttry also held that while physicians ought not
misrepresent their credentials, this issue is best addressed through a
cause of action for fraud or misrepresentation, not informed consent."6
Thus, at least as a matter of common law, the overarching doctrine
seems to be that information about a provider's experience or credentials
is not material information that needs to be disclosed as part of the in-
formed consent process. The few courts that have imposed more strin-
gent disclosure duties have limited them to a duty not to misrepresent
credentials when asked by the patient, or a duty to disclose physician ex-
81. See, e.g., Shock v. United States, 689 F. Supp. 1424, 1425-26 (D. Md. 1988); Duffy v. Flagg,
905 A.2d 15, 21 (Conn. 2006); Ditto v. McCurdy, 947 P.2d 952, 958-59 (Haw. 1997); Foard v. Jarman,
387 S.E.2d 162, 166-67 (N.C. 1990); Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255, 1259 (Pa. 2001); Wlosinski,
713 N.W. 2d at 20; Johnson v Jacobowitz, 884 N.Y.S.2d 158, 162 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009); Zimmerman v.
N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp, 458 N.Y.S.2d 552, 554 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); Avila v. Flangas, No. 04-
95-00106-CV, 1996 WL 63036, at *2 (Tex. App. Feb. 14,1996); Thomas v. Wilcaf, 828 P.2d 597, 600-01
(Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
82. Whiteside v. Lukson, 947 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997); see also Kaskie v. Wright,
589 A.2d 213, 216-17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
83. Whiteside, 947 P.2d at 1265; see also Willis, 596 F.3d at 1256 (quoting Whiteside, 947 P.2d at
1265); Kaskie, 589 A.2d at 217 ("Are patients to be informed of every fact which might conceivably
affect performance in the surgical suite?"); Heinemann, supra note 9, at 1103 ("Such disclosure may be
welcome to patient advocates, but Johnson provides little basis for drawing the line against disclosures
that implicate important issues of physician privacy.").
84. Duttry, 771 A.2d at 1259.
85. Id.
86. Id.; see also Duffy v. Flagg, 905 A.2d 15, 23 (Conn. 2006) ("Nothing in our ruling today sug-
gests that a physician who misleads or misinforms his or her patient about the physician's skills, quali-
fications, or experience may not be liable in damages for misrepresentation."). But see Willis, 596 F.3d
at 1258-59 ("[W]hen the misrepresentation occurs . . . in the course of a physician obtaining the pa-
tient's consent to a proposed treatment or procedure, we see no reason why Wyoming would limit the
patient's claim to the more generic negligent misrepresentation tort . . ."); Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545
N.W.2d 495, 504 n.29 (Wis. 1996) (noting that an "overlap between negligent misrepresentation and
informed consent ... does not preclude the plaintiff from making allegations and introducing evidence
in an informed consent case which might also have been pled in a negligent misrepresentation case").
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perience only if it is significantly likely to increase the risk associated
with the procedure the patient is about to undergo.
Despite courts' reluctance to mandate disclosure of information re-
lating to provider experience, some legal commentators have argued that
there is no reason to exclude it from the doctrine of informed consent.
Information about the risks of a procedure as performed by a particular
provider, according to these authors, relates directly to the probability of
a procedure's success as compared to its alternatives; and a procedure's
probably of success is surely material, even under the most traditional
understandings of informed consent.'
2. Physicians' Financial Conflicts of Interest
The rise of managed care in the 1980s and 1990s brought increased
public attention to the financial relationships between health care pro-
viders and payers. Under managed care, physicians are frequently of-
fered financial incentives-like capitation, bonuses, and withholds-to
provide cost effective care. Patients and policymakers expressed concern
that these financial incentives might lead physicians to limit their use of
diagnostic testing, specialists, and expensive procedures in an effort to
boost their own eamings." Similar concerns were raised about the finan-
cial conflicts of interest arising from physicians' ownership and invest-
ment interests in hospitals.8 9
Legal commentators throughout this era began to consider the idea
that informed consent might be interpreted to encompass disclosures of
physicians' financial incentives and conflicts of interest." If informed
consent law had not yet embraced economic disclosures, they argued, it
87. See, e.g., Iheukwumere, supra note 9, at 413 (noting that "it defies logic to assert that the ex-
perience of a physician is immaterial to a patient's informed consent"); Douglas Sharrott, Provider-
Specific Quality of Care Data: A Proposal for Limited Mandatory Disclosure, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 85,
142 (1992) (arguing that traditional informed consent tests "can be extended to provider-specific risk
information if one views the treatment as not just the procedure itself, but instead as the procedure as
performed by a specific provider"); Twerski & Cohen, supra note 9, at 5 (arguing that "'comparative
provider' cases, although new and revolutionary, are in fact theoretically more sound and practically
easier to resolve than traditional informed consent cases that focus on comparing the risks of alterna-
tive modes of treatment" because they avoid the problems of decision causation inherent in traditional
informed consent suits); Ashley H. Wiltbank, Informed Consent and Physician Inexperience: A Pre-
scription for Liability?, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 563, 565 (2006) (citing empirical evidence that pa-
tients want to know if they are being treated by a medical student, and arguing "it would follow that
most patient-driven informed consent jurisdictions would include physician's experience as a factor in
informed consent"). But see Heinemann, supra note 9 (arguing that "the doctrinal foundation of the
[Kokemoorj decision is ambiguous" and raising policy arguments against the expansion of informed
consent to include information about physician experience).
88. Legislators at the time also banned "gag clauses" in payer contracts that prohibited physi-
cians from discussing managed care payment practices or treatments that would not be covered under
the plan.
89. The Stark self-referral law was designed to address these concerns. See also 42 C.F.R.
§ 489.20(u) (2011) (requiring physicians in physician-owned hospitals to disclose their financial inter-
ests to patients).
90. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, Informed Consent to Rationing Decisions, 71 MILBANK 0. 645 (1993);
Morreim, supra note 5; E. Haavi Morreim, To Tell the Truth: Disclosing the Incentives and Limits of
Managed Care, 3 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 35 (1997); Wolf, supra note 5.
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was only because "until very recently, economics has not been a serious
concern for most patients."91 Under the modem system of managed care,
however, many argued that information about financial pressures to di-
rect or limit care would surely be material to patient decisionmaking.
"Although the concept of 'materiality' can be vague," wrote one com-
mentator, "an incentive system strong enough to prompt significant al-
terations in care can reasonably be considered material."' The American
Medical Association, similarly concerned, adopted an ethical opinion re-
quiring physicians to disclose "any financial incentives that may limit ap-
propriate diagnostic and therapeutic alternatives that are offered to pa-
tients or that may limit patients' overall access to care" (but noting that
these obligations could be satisfied if the health plan itself made the dis-
closure).9 3
Some courts were receptive to these concerns. In a series of well-
publicized lawsuits against HMOs and physicians, patients alleged that
they were harmed by being denied or dissuaded from costly treatment. In
a few cases, courts recognized the validity of claims that a physician's
failure to disclose financial incentives constituted a breach of duty, allow-
ing them to proceed under theories of informed consent or malpractice.94
A Minnesota appellate court in 1997, for example, stated that a physi-
cian's failure to disclose a kickback scheme "presents a classic informed
consent issue."95
Finally, no discussion of physician conflict of interest would be
complete without mentioning Moore v. Regents, University of California,
in which the California Supreme Court held that "a physician who is
seeking a patient's consent for a medical procedure must, in order to sat-
isfy his fiduciary duty and to obtain the patient's informed consent, dis-
close personal interests unrelated to the patient's health, whether re-
search or economic, that may affect his medical judgment."" While that
case dealt with financial incentives to develop and sell a patient's cell
line, rather than economic incentives associated with participation in
managed care, the California court's recognition of the materiality of in-
91. Morreim, supra note 5, at 291.
92. Morreim, supra note 90, at 36; see also BERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 212 (noting that it
would be "fundamentally unfair to deprive patients of information concerning the financial pressures
that may influence their physicians' treatment decisions").
93. Opinion 8.132: Referral of Patients: Disclosure of Limitation, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND
JUD. AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS'N (2007)
94. In most of these cases, the legal issue for resolution was whether a fiduciary duty claim for
nondisclosure would be duplicative of a malpractice/informed consent claim. See, e.g., Shea v. Esen-
sten, 208 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that a jury could find physicians liable for negligent misrep-
resentation for failing to disclose a financial incentive to avoid referrals, where this failure to disclose
prevented the plaintiff "from making an informed choice of whether to seek what might have been a
life-saving referral at his own expense"); Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496 (Ill. 2000) (rejecting a fiduci-
ary duty claim for failure to disclose financial incentives on the grounds that it was duplicative of the
medical malpractice claim); DAB v. Brown, 570 N.w.2d 168 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that
plaintiffs claim that the physician failed to disclose kickbacks was a malpractice claim, not a fiduciary
duty claim).
95. DAB, 570 N.W.2d at 171.
96. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479,485 (Cal. 1990).
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formation about "interests] extraneous to the patient's health [that
have] affected the physician's judgment" continues to be cited today.,
Information about physicians' financial conflicts of interest, while
not medically material under the traditional model, has thus been recog-
nized some courts as relevant to the informed-consent process. 8 This is
perhaps the clearest case of common law legal informed consent duties
extending beyond the bounds of medical materiality.
3. Other Physician-Specific Characteristics
Beyond professional experience and financial conflicts of interest,
there is a host of other physician-specific information that patients might
consider material to their treatment decisions----either in deciding be-
tween different treatment alternatives or in deciding between different
health care providers. This might include information about the physi-
cian's medical history, sleep patterns, substance abuse, disciplinary histo-
ry, malpractice liability, criminal history, and even religious" or political
beliefs."m However, while factors such as these are arguably relevant to
some patients, courts considering common law informed consent claims
on these grounds have generally been unreceptive, except occasionally
where there is concrete evidence of increased medical risk associated
with the physician characteristic.01
97. Id. at 484.
98. It is worth noting that while the existence of a financial conflict of interest is not a medically
material risk in itself, it arguably increases the likelihood of medical malpractice. That is, the reason a
patient might want to know if her physician has a financial conflict is because she worries that this will
lead the physician to recommend treatment that is not medically indicated (as in the case of a physi-
cian who receives money from a pharmaceutical company) or decline to recommend treatment that
would be medically indicated (in the case of MCO incentives to limit costs of care). Were a physician
to deviate from the standard of care, the patient would surely have a claim for medical malpractice;
and the existence of the financial motivation would be, in a sense, irrelevant. See, e.g., Brannan v. Nw.
Permanente, P.C., No. C05-5157FCB, 2006 WL 2794881 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 27, 2006) (denying plain-
tiffs motion to compel production of physician's employment contract in a malpractice suit, and hold-
ing that motive is not an element of a malpractice claim and that evidence of financial incentives is
irrelevant).
99. According to one news report, 2012 presidential candidate Herman Cain publicly expressed
concern that a physician treating his colon cancer was named Dr. Abdallah. "I said to his physician
assistant, I said, 'That sounds foreign-not that I had anything against foreign doctors--but it sounded
too foreign .... She said, 'He's from Lebanon.' Oh, Lebanon! My mind immediately started thinking,
wait a minute, maybe his religious persuasion is different than mine! She could see the look on my face
and she said, 'Don't worry, Mr. Cain, he's a Christian from Lebanon."' Benjy Sarlin, Herman Cain:
Thank God My Arab Doctor Wasn't Muslim!, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Nov. 21, 2011), http://talking
pointsmemo.comlelection20l2/herman-cain-thank-god-my-arab-doctor-wasn-t-muslim.
100. In the context of religious or political beliefs, consider the case of Dr. Kelly McGuire, who
reported patient Purvi Patel to the police when she arrived at an emergency room bleeding and with a
protruding umbilical cord; Patel was ultimately sentenced to twenty years in prison for feticide. Sarah
Kaplan, Indiana Woman Jailed for "Feticide." It's Never Happened Before., WASH. POST (Apr. 1,
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/04/01/indiana-woman-jailed-for-
feticide-its-never-happened-before/. News reports later revealed that Dr. McGuire was a member of
the American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists. David Conrad, Who is the
Doctor who Paved the Way to Prison for Purvi Patel?, PRI.ORG (Apr. 5, 2015), http://www.pri.org/
stories/2015-04-03/doctor-who-called-police-purvi-patel-listed-pro-life-medical-association-member.
101. See infra notes 103-108.
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The reason that a physician's personal characteristics might be rele-
vant to a patient's decision-making is because they may suggest a greater
propensity for negligent or otherwise harmful treatment. For example, a
surgeon who is sleep deprived or suffers from carpal tunnel syndrome
might be less precise in the operating room. The fact that a physician has
been sued for malpractice or subject to professional discipline numerous
times might suggest a propensity for negligent treatment. A patient op-
erated on by a surgeon with a communicable disease may have a risk of
contracting this disease during surgery. And a physician whose religious
beliefs prevent him from offering treatment that other physicians might
deem medically appropriate may cause the patient significant medical
harms.1" In that sense, these factors might reasonably be treated as med-
ically material, because they might affect the physiological outcome of a
given treatment by a particular physician.
Some courts addressing these types of claims have therefore con-
cluded that a physician has a duty to disclose personal information only
to the extent it currently affects the physician's performance and actually
increases a risk associated with treatment. Where, for example, a surgeon
has a health condition that does not actually affect her performance in
the operating room, that information would not qualify as material and
subject to disclosure.0 3 Likewise, numerous courts have held that a phy-
sician's history of substance abuse does not need to be disclosed,"0N except
102. See Nadia N. Sawicki, A Common Law Duty to Disclose Conscience-Based Limitations on
Medical Practice, in LAW, RELIGION AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES (Holly Fernandez Lynch, I.
Glenn Cohen, and Elizabeth Sepper eds., forthcoming 2017); Nadia N. Sawicki, Mandating Disclosure
of Conscience-Based Limitations on Medical Practice, 42 AM. J. L. & MED. _ (forthcoming 2016).
103. See, e.g., Slutzki v. Grabenstetter, No. 01-1482, 2002 WL 31114657, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.
Sept. 25, 2002) (finding that surgeon has no duty to disclose that she suffered from a herniated disc
where the condition only caused pain when the physician was using her arms above shoulder level, and
during operations "the operating table was adjusted to the surgeon's level of comfort, and when in a
position to operate her arms are always down"); May v. Cusick, 630 N.W.2d 277 (Wis. Ct. App. May 1,
2001) (finding no duty to disclose history of two minor strokes where there was no evidence that phy-
sician suffered residual effects from the strokes that would constitute a material risk); cf. Hawk v.
Chattanooga Orthopedic Grp., 45 S.W.3d 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (allowing informed consent claim
under Tennessee statute to proceed where surgeon failed to inform patient that he had a disabling
hand condition that may have impaired his performance).
104. See, e.g., Albany Urology Clinic, P.C. v. Cleveland, 528 S.E.2d. 777 (Ga. 2000) (denying in-
formed consent, fraud, and battery claims grounded in a physician's failure to disclose "negative per-
sonal life factor [history of cocaine use] that, although not directly related to the professional relation-
ship, may, depending upon a patient's subjectively held beliefs, impact upon the patient's consent"
where there was no evidence that the physician was under the influence of cocaine at the time of
treatment); Williams v. Booker, 712 S.E.2d 617 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that neither physician
nor hospital had a duty to disclose physician's alcohol abuse); Kaskie v. Wright, 589 A.2d 213 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 1991) (refusing to expand the doctrine of informed consent to cases where the plaintiffs were
actually informed of the "particular procedures," but were not informed of "facts personal to the treat-
ing physician," like alcoholism); Mau v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 668 N.W.2d 562 (Wis. Ct. App.
2003) (denying an informed consent claim where a doctor with a history of substance abuse had not
been using drugs in the months before treating the patient, and was not operating under the influence
at the time of the operation). But see Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192 (La. App. 1991) (upholding
trial court finding that failure to disclose chronic alcohol use was a breach of the duty to obtain in-
formed consent, where the trial judge found as a matter of fact that the physician "abused alcohol at
the time of [plaintiffs] surgery," and expert testified that performing surgery under the influence of
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perhaps where the physician's treatment of the patient actually occurs
under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or translates into conduct falling
below the standard of care."os Even the context of HIV disclosure, where
early informed consent claims were sometimes successful, falls within this
categorization of medical risk.10 While early courts that acknowledged a
physician's duty to disclose her HIV status recognized that the probabil-
ity of HIV transmission from doctor to patient is quite low, they ground-
ed their findings of possible duty in the fact that the consequences of
transmission, at the time, effectively constituted a death sentence.10 As
noted by the Maryland Supreme Court in Faya v. Almaraz, the existence
of a duty is based on both the probability and seriousness of harm, and
"[w]hile it may be unlikely that an infected doctor will transmit the AIDS
virus to a patient during surgery, the patient will almost surely die if the
virus is transmitted."10s
However, most courts hold that disclosure of a physician's personal
characteristics is not required, even where those characteristics arguably
increase the medical risk to the patient. Courts adopting this view base it
on a narrow vision of medical materiality-the idea that doctors only
need to disclose risks "inherent in the treatment," and not risks that are
dependent on who is performing the procedure.o' As recognized by the
alcohol would be a breach of the standard of care and that a physician suffering from alcohol depend-
ence should inform his patient of this fact).
105. Williams, 712 S.E.2d at 620 ("The mere fact of a physician's drug or alcohol addiction or use
at the time of the alleged malpractice does not create, in and of itself, a separate issue or claim of med-
ical malpractice. Rather, 'it is only when that alcoholism translates into conduct falling below the ap-
plicable standard of care that it has any relevance."').
106. During the development of the HIV/AIDS crisis in the late 1980s, many patients who
learned that they were treated by HIV-positive physicians brought claims of negligent infliction of
emotional distress. Health care institutions, in turn, struggled with the issue of whether HIV-positive
health care providers should be treating patients, and, if so, whether they should be required to dis-
close their health status. Some hospitals required their physicians to disclose their HIV status; physi-
cians challenged these actions as discriminatory. See, e.g., Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp., 887 F. Supp.
765 (E.D. Pa 1994); Estate of Behringer v. Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d. 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1991).
107. Estate of Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1251 (holding that the risk of HIV transmission would be a
legitimate concern to reasonable patients warranting disclosure, because the risk, while low, is not neg-
ligible, and the potential harm is severe in a discrimination claim by a physician against a hospital that
required him to disclose his HIV status); see also Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993) (finding a
viable informed consent claim by patients of an HIV-positive surgeon because the risk of transmission,
while "extremely low," was foreseeable, and the consequences of transmission are dire). However,
given the dramatic advances in medical care for HIV-positive patients in the past decades, and the fact
that many HIV-positive patients go on to lead long and fulfilling lives, it is unclear whether these legal
conclusions would still stand today. See Centers for Disease Control, Recommendations for Preventing
Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During Exposure-
Prone Invasive Procedures, 40 MMWR 1 (1991) (recommending that infected health care workers
seek counsel from an expert review panel to determine under what circumstances they may perform
exposure-prone procedures; noting that one condition may include "notifying prospective patients of
the HCW's seropositivity before they undergo exposure-prone invasive procedures").
108. Faya, 620 A.2d at 333.
109. See discussion at supra notes 43-45; see also, e.g., Curran v. Buser, 711 N.W.2d 562 (Neb.
2006) (finding that the standard of care did not require disclosure of physician's disciplinary history);
Cipriano v. Ho, 908 N.Y.S.2d 552 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (noting lack of common law to support an in-
formed consent claim based on failure to disclose prior restriction of physician's surgical privileges);
Kaskie, 589 A.2d at 217 (refusing to expand informed consent to require disclosure of physician's al-
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Pennsylvania Superior Court in Kaskie v. Wright, expanding informed
consent to include "facts personal to the treating physician, . . . extends
the doctrine into realms well beyond its original boundaries.""
Some physician-specific characteristics, however, may be of interest
to patients despite their having absolutely no connection with the medi-
cal risks of treatment. Some patients might prefer not to be treated by a
physician who is a Democrat, a woman, or belongs to particular religion.
Others might opt not to seek treatment from a physician with a criminal
history unrelated to her medical practice. Under broad standards of ma-
teriality, a patient who could demonstrate that a reasonable person
would not have pursued treatment by that physician (decision causation)
might be able to recover--but only if she could also prove that the injury
she suffered was caused by the undisclosed fact (injury causation). Injury
causation, however, will be extraordinarily difficult to prove-a point
discussed in greater detail in Part IV.D. In any event, no serious pro-
posals have been made to expand informed consent to these arenas.
Moreover, while anecdotal evidence suggests that some patients care
about these types of issues, there is no evidence that any disgruntled pa-
tient has brought suit on this basis.
B. Patients' Nonmedical Interests
A patient's decision about whether or not to proceed with a particu-
lar treatment may also be driven by the treatment's impact on her non-
medical interests. That is, the precise physiological consequences of a
medical intervention may be less important to the patient than its satis-
faction of her nonmedical goals. These can include financial goals (avoid-
ing medical bankruptcy), legal goals (obtaining favorable medical testi-
mony in a civil or criminal trial), social goals (being able to meaningfully
participate in a family member's wedding; maintaining privacy), life goals
(maintaining fertility"' or avoiding pregnancy"'), and cosmetic goals (be-
ing able to wear high heels,"' feeling physically attractivell4 ). While
coholism and lack of license to practice, noting that in this case the patient was indeed informed of the
risks of the "particular procedures . . . irrespective of the surgeon performing them"). These cases
adopt similar reasoning to those cases rejecting disclosure of information about physician experience
and qualifications. See supra Part IV.A.1.
110. Kaskie, 589 A.2d at 217.
111. Redford v. United States, Civ. No. 89-2324 (CRR), 1992 WL 84898 (D.D.C. Apr. 10, 1992)
(finding physicians liable where they failed to explain to a patient who wished to remain fertile that
hysterectomy was not medically necessary to protect her health).
112. See, e.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (affirming judgment in favor of
patient where physician failed to disclose risk of pregnancy after laparoscopic cauterization, and hold-
ing that the physician must make disclosure based on what he knows or should have known to be rele-
vant to the patient based on her medical history as well as "other factors that might make knowledge
of certain risks particularly important to a certain patient"); Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014 (Md. 1977)
(remanding for new trial where patient sought sterilization due to concerns about physical and finan-
cial harms arising from pregnancy, and physician allegedly failed to inform her that the tubal ligation
procedure was not guaranteed to be successful).
113. Hartman v. D'Ambrosia, 665 So. 2d 1206 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding a trial court's
judgment for a patient whose goal in having bunion surgery was to have a "normal" foot and be able
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courts have almost uniformly rejected the idea that medical providers
might have a common law duty to disclose factors affecting nonmedical
interests, a number of legal and medical commentators have proposed
expanding consent disclosures in this way. Moreover, legislatures, in the
unique context of informed consent to abortion, have expanded physi-
cians' disclosure duties to include information about the nonmedical im-
plications of the procedure.
Generally, courts are in agreement that physicians have no common
law duty to inform patients about the nonmedical consequences of a pro-
cedure. In Arato v. Avedon, for example, a patient's family argued that
his physician had breached his duty to obtain informed consent by failing
to disclose "all material facts that might affect" the patient's "rights and
interests," including his financial interests in estate planning."' The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court firmly rejected this argument, citing its own ad-
monition in Moore that a "physician is not the patient's financial advi-
sor.""6 It held that California law does not impose on physicians an
"undefined [duty] to disclose every contingency that might affect the pa-
tient's nonmedical 'rights and interests." "
Other courts have used similar reasoning to reject informed consent
claims based on a physician's failure to inform a patient of facts affecting
her nonmedical interests. In State v. Presidential Woman's Center, the
Florida Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's claim that an abortion in-
formed consent statute was unconstitutionally vague because it did not
explicitly limit the scope of required disclosure to medical risks."' "Physi-
cians are not sociologists, economists, theologians, or philosophers," the
court noted, "and it is implausible to conclude that the Legislature in-
tended that physicians be required to venture far beyond their profes-
sional specialty and expertise to advise patients of nonmedical matters"
such as the social or economic risks of abortion." 9
Similarly, in a case where a psychiatric evaluation requested by a
patient's attorney resulted in adverse testimony in a criminal trial, a Tex-
as court rejected a claim grounded in nondisclosure of the legal risks as-
to wear high heels, where the physician failed to inform the patient that the surgery would not achieve
this goal).
114. See Maxwell J. Mehlman & Jessica W. Berg, Evaluating Biomedical Enhancement Research:
Assessing Risk & Benefit and Obtaining Informed Consent, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 546 (2008) (dis-
cussing the patient-specific evaluation of the cosmetic benefits of breast augmentation surgery).
115. Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 608 (Cal. 1993).
116. Id. (citing Moore v. Regents, Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485 n.10 (Cal. 1990)). While Moore
ultimately held that a physician's fiduciary duty to his patient includes a duty to disclose his own con-
flicts of interest, the court noted that the basis of this obligation is "not because he has a duty to pro-
tect his patient's financial interests, but because certain personal interests may affect professional
judgment." Moore, 793 P.2d at 485 n.10.
117. Arato, 858 P.2d at 609; see also In re Estate of Blacher, 857 P.2d 566 (Colo. App. 1993) (af-
firming trial court's dismissal of a claim by deceased patient's wife that physician's misdiagnosis caused
the patient to cancel his life insurance policy).
118. State v. Presidential Woman's Ctr., 937 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 2006).
119. Id. at 119-20.
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sociated with medical care.20 The court held that the possibility of ad-
verse testimony based on a psychiatric diagnosis was a "risk concern[ing]
the legal, rather than the medical, consequences of the diagnosis" and
that the patient's attorney (rather than his psychiatrist) was the person
best suited to advise the patient of this legal risk.121
Legal scholars refer to the principle established in these cases as re-
flecting a "therapeutic limitation" to informed consent disclosure.'22 Ac-
cording to Judith Daar, cases like Arato "tell[] physicians that they need
not look beyond the medical needs of their patients in disclosing infor-
mation about treatment. The physician need not be concerned with his
patient as an investor, a business manager, a father, or a spouse."'23 Rob-
ert Gatter, likewise, acknowledges that the common law of informed
consent "generally permits physicians to remain ignorant of a patient's
non-medical characteristics" (like the desire to "participate in daughter's
wedding rather than maximize chances of cure") despite the fact that
these nonmedical characteristics are extremely relevant to a patient's
treatment preferences. 24
However, many commentators seem troubled by the common law
limitation on the scope of disclosure to medical interests. Judith Daar
notes that "the realities of human decision-making will inevitably blur
[the] line [between medical and nonmedical interests]" and contends that
a requirement that physicians only disclose information relevant to the
patient's medical interests "defies the nature of communication."'" Rob-
ert Gatter, while stopping short of advocating for affirmative disclosure
duties, recommends a broader duty of physician inquiry as part of the in-
formed consent process-physicians, he argues, ought to be obligated to
inquire about the patient's subjective and nonmedical goals of treatment
before providing treatment recommendations.'26
This Part provides an overview of a number of contexts in which le-
gal and medical scholars, and sometimes even policymakers, have sug-
gested broadening the scope of informed consent disclosure to reach pa-
tients' personal interests.
120. Clark v. Grigson, 579 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
121. Id. at 265.
122. The term "therapeutic limitation" was first used by the Supreme Court of California in Ara-
to, 858 P.2d at 609.
123. Daar, supra note 16, at 195; see also Richard M. Alderman, The Business of Medicine-Health
Care Providers, Physicians, and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 26 HoUs. L. REv. 109 (1989) (con-
cluding that the doctrine of informed consent does not extend to "nonmedical information" like the
business or financial aspects of medical care); Robert Gatter, Informed Consent Law and the Forgotten
Duty of Physician Inquiry, 31 Loy. U. CHICAGO L.J. 557, 571 (2000) (interpreting Arato as "indirect-
ly" defining the scope of inquiry to patient's medical characteristics only).
124. Gatter, supra note 123, at 567-68.
125. Daar, supra note 16, at 195-196.
126. Gatter, supra note 123, at 579.
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1. Financial Interests: Cost of Treatment
The concern that informed consent doctrine is insufficiently protec-
tive of patients' nonmedical interests has drawn attention most recently
in the context of the dramatic shift in the landscape of health care financ-
ing. Consumers have been shocked by recent empirical studies and news
reports publicizing the dramatic variability among the costs of different
treatments (or the cost of the same treatment in different institutions). 127
Consequently, in the past two years, three articles in major medical jour-
nals and journals of medical ethics have argued that physicians ought to
have a legal or ethical duty to protect their patient's financial interests by
informing them about the cost of treatment.128
Because of the catastrophic impact medical bills can have on a pa-
tient's financial situation, Kevin Riggs and Peter Ubel argue that physi-
cians have an ethical duty to initiate conversations about the financial
burdens of care on a patient "in the same way they would discuss the ad-
verse effects of a treatment."1 29 Ubel and others ground this claim, at
least in part, in the link between financial well-being and medical well-
being-arguing, for example, that financial insecurity can cause people
to "cut corners in ways that may affect their health and well-being," like
spending less on food, clothing, or prescriptions.130 In a prescient article
published almost twenty years ago, Michael Wilkes and David Schriger
noted that "financial well-being is certainly within the boundaries of
most peoples' concept of health."1 3 '
While it is certainly true that financial security implicates health
outcomes, so do a host of other factors-including housing status, job
stability, food insecurity, discrimination, and the availability of social
support networks. And while progressive medical providers are learning
about the importance of inquiring about these social determinants of
health during routine medical visits,13 2 they may be not be prepared to
predict the impact of a given medical intervention on these social factors.
A more justifiable argument for including disclosure of costs as part
of informed consent is made by Alicia Hall, who grounds her position in
theories of patient autonomy. Since the purpose of informed consent is
to facilitate autonomous decision-making about medical treatment, and
since "what counts as a benefit for a patient cannot be determined by the
127. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
128. Hall, supra note 14; Riggs & Ubel, supra note 14; Ubel et al., supra note 14.
129. Riggs & Ubel, supra note 14, at 849; see also Ubel et al., supra note 14, at 1486 (noting that
"given the distress created by out-of-pocket costs, it is well within physicians' traditional duties to dis-
cuss such matters with our patients").
130. Id. at 1485 (also referring to the discussion of costs tradeoffs as "mak[ing] clinical sense").
131. Michael S. Wilkes & David L. Schriger, Caution: The Meter is Running: Informing Patients
About Health Care Costs, 165 W. J. MED. 74, 78 (1996) (noting that "discussions about the cost of care
are an important part of the physician-patient relationship").
132. Medical-legal partnerships like Loyola University Chicago School of Law's Health Justice
Project (http://luc.edu/law/centers/healthlaw/hjp/index.html) aim to educate health care providers
about these considerations.
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physician from an objective medical standpoint," information about fi-
nancial risks is essential for patients to make appropriate trade-offs-
particularly in an environment where "health care providers are also
health care vendors, and patients are also consumers, medical providers
take on the additional obligations associated with business owners and
managers."l 3
Critics of this argument worry that including a discussion of costs as
part of informed consent will transform the doctor-patient relationship
into a mercantile model driven by cost containment, where patients will
no longer trust their physicians to provide the best clinical advice.M
However, as Hall recognizes, not every medical option is available to pa-
tients even under our current system, and at least disclosure of cost in-
formation would make this more transparent.1 31
The most significant concern about proposals to incorporate costs
discussions into informed consent is that physicians typically lack accu-
rate information about the cost of treatment.'3 1 While proponents of cost
disclosure recognize this fact, some argue that the ethical duty to disclose
costs requires physicians to educate themselves about treatment costs
under various insurance policies, and make inquiries about the patients'
financial circumstances in order to satisfy this duty.1 37 It would be unjust,
many argue, for vulnerable patients to bear the burden of discovery and
inquiry when providers are likely have greater ease of access to this in-
formation."'
2. Social and Ethical Arguments
Not all factors that might impact a patient's choice of medical
treatment are as concrete as its financial impact. Some controversial
treatments may also have social and ethical implications that some have
argued ought to be considered as part of the informed consent process.
Notable examples include abortion, surrogacy, end-of-life care, and ge-
133. Hall, supra note 14, at 42,44.
134. As noted by Joseph Fins, "If some treatment options are out of a patient's 'price range,' . . .
[w]ould providers simply exclude the more expensive options from the alternatives available to other
customers with coverage or better insurance? So much for the notion of informed consent as the con-
veyance of risk, benefits, and alternatives. Put an asterisk on that and revise the construct as 'some'
alternatives." Joseph J. Fins, Fee Disclosure at a Cost, 44 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 3 (2014) (commentary
on Hall, supra note 14).
135. Alicia Hall, The Author Replies, 44 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 4 (2014) (commentary on Fins, su-
pra note 134).
136. See, e.g., Giridhar Mallya et al., Are Primary Care Physicians Ready to Practice in a Consum-
er-Driven Environment?, 14 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 661, 665 (2008) (noting that PCPs "may not have
the requisite knowledge to help patients ... make such decisions.").
137. G. Caleb Alexander et al., Rethinking Professional Ethics in the Cost-Sharing Era, 6 AM. J.
BIOETHICS W17, W20-21 (2006); Hall, supra note 14, at 44-45; Riggs & Ubel, supra note 14, at 849;
Ubel et al., supra note 14, at 1486.
138. Hall, supra note 14, at 44-45. Essentially, Hall's argument boils down to the idea that in-
formed consent obligations should be based on physicians' special expertise, and that in the modern
American health care system, physicians' expertise extends to the nonmedical arena of cost. This is a
hotly-debated empirical question.
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netic testing-medical interventions that pro-life advocates, disability
advocates, and others have challenged as potentially demeaning to hu-
man dignity. Accordingly, some commentators have suggested that phy-
sicians seeking informed consent to these types of medical care be re-
quired to first inform the patient of the ethical arguments and social
implications surrounding their choice.
This concern is most prominent in the context of abortion. Some
state legislatures have recently adopted laws requiring physicians to pre-
sent women seeking abortions with information that critics say reflects
ethical perspectives on abortion rather than its medical consequences.
For example, a South Dakota law passed in 2005 requires physicians to
disclose that abortion "will terminate the life of a whole, separate,
unique, living human being" with whom a woman enjoys a constitutional-
ly protected relationship. 9 The U.S. District Court for the District of
South Dakota initially enjoined enforcement of this provision, holding
that it "requires abortion doctors to enunciate the State's viewpoint on
an unsettled medical, philosophical, theological, and scientific issue, that
is, whether a fetus is a human being."' The statute was ultimately up-
held on appeal by the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc-but even then, a
strongly worded dissent by four judges argued that the statute was un-
constitutional because it required physicians to "advise their patients on
metaphysical matters about which there is no medical consensus" and
which are "unrelated to the intended medical procedure."' 1
As a matter of common law, however, the two states that have con-
sidered the issue both held that the law of informed consent does not re-
quire doctors to tell their pregnant patients that aborting a fetus consti-
tutes the killing of a "human being." In Acuna v. Turkish, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey considered a malpractice action by a woman who
claimed that her OB/GYN "breached a duty owed to her by failing to in-
form her of 'the scientific and medical fact that [her six- to eight-week-
old embryo] was a complete, separate, unique and irreplaceable human
being" and that an abortion would result in 'killing an existing human be-
139. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (West 2015) (upheld in Planned Parenthood Minn. v.
Rounds, 653 F.3d 662 (8th Cir.), opinion vacated in part on reh'g en banc sub nom. Planned
Parenthood Minn., N. Dakota, S. Dakota v. Rounds, 662 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2011) and on reh'g en
banc in part sub nom. Planned Parenthood Minn., N. Dakota, S. Dakota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 (8th
Cir. 2012)). Identical language is included in the abortion informed consent laws of North Dakota, and
Kansas. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-6709(b)(5), 65-6710 (West 2015); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-02
(West 2015).
140. Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d 881, 887 (D.S.D. 2005), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724.
141. Id. at 741 (Murphy, Wollman, Bye, Melloy, J., dissenting). However, another South Dakota
law aimed at ensuring that women seeking abortions are exposed to pro-life arguments prior to con-
senting to the procedure has recently failed. The 2011 law would have required every woman seeking
an abortion, one day prior to the procedure, to obtain a consultation at a crisis pregnancy center
whose "principal mission" is "to provide education, counseling, and other assistance to help a pregnant
mother maintain her relationship with her unborn child and care for her unborn child." The law was
preliminarily enjoined on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.
Dakota, S. Dakota v. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1053 (D.S.D. 2011).
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ing."'142 The court roundly rejected the plaintiff's claim, noting that the
common law duty of informed consent only requires disclosure of "mate-
rial information concerning the medical risks of a procedure."1 4 3 The
court contrasted the disclosures requested by the plaintiff, noting that
there was no medical or social consensus that these statements were
medical facts, "as opposed to firmly held moral, philosophical, and reli-
gious beliefs." 1" In 2011, an Illinois appellate court reached the same
conclusion, holding that health care providers at Planned Parenthood did
not breach their common law duty of informed consent when they in-
formed the pregnant plaintiff that the fetus she was carrying was not a
"human being."1 45 According to the court, nothing in Illinois common law
requires providers to disclose "something other than [their own] scien-
tific, moral, or philosophical viewpoint [on the issue of when life be-
gins]."146
Prenatal genetic testing is another context where critics have chal-
lenged the standard informed consent regime. Typically used to screen
for disabilities like Down syndrome, prenatal genetic testing offers pro-
spective parents the opportunity to make informed decisions about
whether to procreate naturally, whether to procreate at all, or whether to
terminate a pregnancy.1 47 However, as recognized by Elizabeth Emens
and other scholars, "at some level, the message from the doctors urging
amniocentesis ... is that having a disabled child is worse than not having
a child."1 4 8 This message, according to many disability advocates, reflects
a one-sided and inaccurate perspective on disability.149 Instead, Emens
suggests, parents undergoing prenatal genetic testing should be present-
ed with accurate information about life opportunities for children with
disabilities, as well as other resources that might help correct for internal
biases and misconceptions about disability. 0 The hope is that providing
appropriate framing for information about disability would help remove
social stigma about disability and improve societal attitudes towards
those living with disabilities.
Similarly, in an article about growth attenuation for minors with
profound disabilities, a group of physicians, philosophers, and attorneys
(the Seattle Growth Attenuation and Ethics Working Group) recognized
the profound social implications of this controversial treatment."' The
142. Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 418 (N.J. 2007). The plaintiff also argued that "every physi-
cian, before performing an abortion, must advise the patient in clear and understandable language that
'the family member [the embryo] is already in existence and that the procedure-indeed the central
purpose of the procedure--is intended to kill that family member."' Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Doe v. Planned Parenthood/Chi. Area, 956 N.E.2d 564 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
146. Id. at 573 (referring to this as "a contention that we find borders on contrivance").
147. Elizabeth F. Emens, Framing Disability, 2012 U. ILL. L. REv. 1383, 1412-13.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1417.
151. Benjamin S. Wilfond et al, Navigating Growth Attenuation in Children with Profound Disa-
bilities, 40 HASTINGS CTR. REPORT 27 (2010).
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Working Group ultimately recommended that parents considering
growth attenuation "be made aware of the objections to growth attenua-
tion expressed by organizations and individual members of disability
communities"152 by being provided with "information summarizing argu-
ments for and against this controversial intervention."'s However, one
member of the Working Group criticized this recommendation as a "re-
markable intrusion into private medical decisions," noting that it would
similarly require that "parents seeking cochlear implants for a deaf child,
surgical correction for club feet or scoliosis, or a do-not-resuscitate order
for a terminally ill child ... be reminded that their decisions may be of-
fensive to others and should be given literature on the reasons for those
disagreements."'54
As a legal matter, however, no court or legislature has even ap-
proached the issue of including information recommended by disability
advocates as part of the informed consent process for genetic testing or
growth attenuation.
3. Impact on Third Parties
Closely related to the suggestion that patients be informed of the
ethical implications of their treatment choices is the argument that, when
third parties are affected by a patient's treatment decision, the patient
ought to be told about those effects.
Again, this argument arises most commonly in the abortion context,
where some state informed consent laws require that physicians perform
an ultrasound or auscultation, display the ultrasound image to the pa-
tient, and inform her of the age and size of the fetus,"' which could argu-
ably be considered a third party for the purposes of this discussion. 5
Even in states without ultrasound laws, state informed consent brochures
frequently include images and descriptions of fetuses at various stages of
development so that a woman considering abortion understands the con-
sequences of the procedure on the fetus."' The Supreme Court in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey expressly permitted such disclosures during
the informed consent process, noting that "most women considering an
abortion would deem the impact on the fetus relevant, if not dispositive,
152. Id. at 37.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 30.
155. See generally Nadia N. Sawicki, Compelling Images: The Constitutionality of Emotionally
Persuasive Health Campaigns, 73 MD. L. REv. 458, at 469-71 (2014); see also the Arkansas Human
Heartbeat Protection Act, ARK. CODE ANN. H§ 20-16-1303(d), (e) (West 2013), which requires physi-
cians to disclose the existence of a fetal heartbeat; the disclosure provision was upheld in Edwards v.
Beck, 8 F. Supp. 3d 1091, 1101 (E.D. Ark. 2014), affd, No. 14-1891, 2015 WL 3395549 (8th Cir. May
27,2015).
156. This author takes no position on the issue of fetal status. It is worth noting, however, that in
the context of diagnostic and therapeutic prenatal interventions, women are routinely told about the
risks to the fetus of such interventions (such as amniocentesis, for example).
157. Nadia N. Sawicki, The Abortion Informed Consent Debate: More Light, Less Heat, 21
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y, 7 (2011).
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to the decision."' While recognizing that information about the conse-
quences to the fetus "have no direct relation to [the woman's] health,"
the Court found no constitutional barrier to state laws requiring disclo-
sure of such information.'
In Casey, the Court analogized to the context of organ donation,
writing, "We would think it constitutional for the State to require that in
order for there to be informed consent to a kidney transplant operation
the recipient must be supplied with information about risks to the donor
as well as risks to himself or herself."'60 Indeed, it seems clear that a live
kidney donor would want to know about the impact his donation will
have on the recipient. For example, he might not go through the proce-
dure if he were informed that the chances of rejection were very high, or
if the recipient were likely to die from other causes post-transplant.
Likewise, the prospective recipient of a live kidney donation (particularly
by a close friend or family member) might not consent to the procedure
if he had concerns about the health implications of kidney removal on
the donor.
Contemporary discussions about the mechanism of action of emer-
gency contraception implicate similar concerns. In a recent article about
physicians' disclosure duties in this context, Cameron O'Brien Flynn and
Robin Fretwell Wilson argue that because many women care about the
mechanism of action by which emergency contraception operates-
specifically, whether the drugs have a postfertilization effect-physicians
ought to share this information.' 6 '
Surrogate pregnancy is another situation where a treatment's physi-
ological impact on third parties might be relevant to patient's decision.
Part of the reason many people feel uncomfortable with surrogates bear-
ing intentional parents' children is because surrogate pregnancy imposes
significant physical and emotional risks on the surrogate.16 2 It seems rea-
sonable to conclude that some people who are unable to bear children on
their own reject surrogacy in favor of other options (like adoption) in
part due to concerns about the impact on the surrogate.
While some medical procedures (like abortion, organ donation, and
surrogacy) have a clear physiological impact on third parties, others may
have third-party consequences that are less tangible. The context of ge-
netic testing provides one such example. Empirical research demon-
strates that many patients who choose to undergo diagnostic genetic test-
ing do so in large part "to generate information about other family
158. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
159. Id. While the Casey decision was one about the constitutional validity of state abortion re-
strictions, and not about the common law standard for informed consent, the language used by the
court is instructive.
160. Id. at 882-83.
161. Cameron O'Brien Flynn & Robin Fretwell Wilson, When States Regulate Emergency Contra-
ceptives Like Abortion, What Should Guide Disclosure?, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHiCS 72,73 (2015).
162. See generally Hillary L. Berk, The Legalization of Emotion: Managing Risk by Managing
Feelings in Contracts for Surrogate Labor, 49 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 143 (2015).
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members' risks, most frequently their offspring."'6 3 Based on this evi-
dence, Nina Hallowell has argued that health care providers obtaining
informed consent to genetic testing "need to give [patients] the oppor-
tunity to reflect upon the impact that any decision may have upon their
relationships with particular others.""
Incorporating facts about a treatment's nonphysiological effects on
third parties has also been suggested in the context of limiting healthcare
costs. In an article about the financial impact of medical choices on the
healthcare system as a whole, M. A. Graber and J. F. Tansey note that
many patients are "unaware of the social impact of their medical op-
tions," like the economic impact of choosing a brand name medication
over a generic.6 Thus, they suggest that doctors should initiate "dialogue
about social justice as part of ... the informed consent process."'" For
example, they offer the following proposed consent form for patients re-
questing high-cost prescriptions:
I, as the patient, am requesting that my provider prescribe drug
for me. I understand there are less expensive medica-
tions that are also effective. I understand that by requesting this
more expensive medication I am increasing healthcare costs to oth-
ers, increasing the cost of insurance, using resources that could be
used elsewhere in the healthcare system and may be taking an addi-
tional risk to my health as all of the side effects of new drugs may
be not known. The reason that I am asking for this medication is
. I believe that the benefit to me out-
weighs the potential risks and resultant harms to others.'67
Finally, the impact of medical treatment (or lack thereof) on others may
be relevant to patients in public health contexts. Recent outbreaks of
measles and whooping cough have made obvious the threat that vaccina-
tion refusal poses.'" Physicians treating children of vaccine refusers
might be inclined to inform parents not only of the benefits that vaccina-
tion offers to their own children, but the greater public health benefits
associated with herd immunity. Arguably, some parents might find this
information material to their decision about whether to vaccinate their
children.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, no court or legislature has followed these
suggestions to incorporate social justice discussions into the legal obliga-
tion of informed consent.
163. Nina Hallowell, Consent to Genetic Testing: A Family Affair?, in THE LIMITSOF CONSENT: A
SOCIO-ETHICAL APPROACH TO HUMAN SUBJECT RESEARCH IN MEDICINE 189 (Oonagh Corrigan et
al., eds., 2009).
164. Id. at 195 ("Consent procedures need to emphasize these things, not sweep them under a
carpet of information about abstract risks and benefits.").
165. M. A. Graber & J. F. Tansey, Autonomy, Consent, and Limiting Healthcare Costs, 31 J. MED.
ETHICS 424, 425 (2005).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Alexandra Sifferlin, 4 Diseases Making a Comeback Thanks to Anti-Vaxxers, TIME (Mar. 17,
2014), http://time.com/27308/4-diseases-making-a-comeback-thanks-to-anti-vaxxers.
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4. Privacy Implications
Some commentators have suggested that where medical diagnosis
or treatment poses a risk of violating a patients' privacy, physicians ought
to affirmatively disclose this fact. While federal laws like HIPAA 6 9 and
HITECHoo as well as state privacy laws provide a great deal of protec-
tion for patients' medical information, there are some contexts that these
laws do not cover and that patients might not recognize as potentially
risky from a privacy perspective. Genetic testing and storage of blood
and tissue samples are two such contexts."'
Sheldon Kurtz has argued that in the context of genetic testing, pa-
tient's privacy interests are so important that the law should require phy-
sicians to disclose of "the consequences of having information about the
person stored in data banks" as part of the informed consent process.' 2
These include the risk that stored genetic information might be shared
with insurers, employers, or others in ways that might disadvantage pa-
tients."'
Likewise, many patients do not recognize that blood and tissue
samples extracted for diagnostic purposes may be stored by health care
facilities for extended periods of time and may even be used for other
purposes to which the patients did not initially consent. Examples of cas-
es where patients have subsequently learned about and objected to the
storage and/or use of their bodily materials abound-from John Moore's
suit against the University of California for the commercialization of a
cell line based on his leukemia cells;'7 4 to the development of the ex-
tremely lucrative HeLa cell line without the knowledge or consent of
Henrietta Lacks or her family;"' to the more recent controversy sur-
rounding Minnesota's storage of newborn blood spots.' 6 One could
therefore argue that if the privacy risks associated with the extraction of
169. 42 U.S.C. § 201 etseq. (2012).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 300jj etseq. (2012).
171. Another example can be found in the context of unusual procedures that likely to be report-
ed in the media. In an article about facial transplants, one author mentions a consent form for facial
transplants includes disclosure of the potential for media intrusions in their personal lives. AP, Facing
Up to Ultimate Transplant, WIRED (Sept. 19, 2005), http://archive.wired.com/medtech/health/
news/2005/09/68907.
172. Sheldon F. Kurtz, The Law of Informed Consent: From 'Doctor is Right' to 'Patient Has
Rights', 50 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1243, 1258 (2000).
173. Id. While the 2008 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act protects against genetic dis-
crimination in employment and health insurance, it offers no such protection for discrimination in oth-
er spheres, such as life, disability, and long-term care insurance. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff et seq. (2012).
174. Moore v. Regents, Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479,481-82 (Cal. 1990).
175. REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS (2010).
176. Challengers to Minnesota's blood spot law obtained a victory in 2011, when the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that the state's storage and dissemination of blood samples violated the state's
genetic privacy law. Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d 766 , 776 (Minn. 2011). Over 1 million blood spots
were destroyed pursuant to a subsequent settlement. Lorna Benson, After Settlement, Minn. to Destroy
1.iM Newborn Blood Samples, MINN. PUBLIC RADIO (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.mprnews.org/story/
2014/01/13/health/newborn-genetic-material-storage-settlement. A 2014 law later authorized the state
department of health to store new blood spots indefinitely starting in August 2014 with parental con-
sent. 2014 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 144.125 (West).
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bodily material are substantial enough that they would cause patients to
decline a diagnostic or therapeutic procedure, those risks ought to be dis-
closed.'"
5. Availability of Support and Resources
A final category of information that might be material to a patients'
medical decisions (but would not fall within the category of medical ma-
teriality) is information about financial and social support resources
available to the patient depending on her health care decision.
In the abortion context, legislatures have taken the lead on incorpo-
rating such information into the informed consent process. Many states
require that patients seeking abortions be provided with information
about adoption agencies, crisis pregnancy centers, state financial assis-
tance, medical assistance,"' and social support services available to
mothers and children." In 1986, the Supreme Court in Thornburgh v.
Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists rejected as unconstitutional a
requirement that women seeking abortions be advised of the availability
of medical assistance benefits and paternal financial support, noting that
the required information was "nonmedical information beyond the phy-
sician's area of expertise," "irrelevant and inappropriate" for many pa-
tients, and ultimately "not relevant to [informed] consent."' In 1992,
however, the Supreme Court's decision in Casey rendered such argu-
ments invalid. In Casey, Court found that "information relating to ... the
assistance available" to women who choose to carry their pregnancies to
term is relevant to a woman's abortion decision, and therefore that a
statutory requirement requiring disclosure of opportunities to review
such information is a "reasonable measure to ensure an informed
choice."'
177. This result can be avoided, however, because there is often a second opportunity for conver-
sation and consent after the procedure is complete. That is, it is possible to disentangle a patient's con-
sent to diagnostic testing from her subsequent consent to storage or research use of the samples. In-
deed, it may be better to split the consent process in this way. Disclosing a risk of privacy breach when
asking for consent to diagnostic testing may cause patients to decline testing if they believe the privacy
risk is unavoidable. However, splitting the consent process into two consent conversations--one for
the procedure and one for subsequent use of blood or tissue--makes it clear that the patient can reap
the benefits of diagnostic testing without suffering its attendant privacy risks.
178. See also Mraz v. Taft, 619 N.E.2d 483, 486-88 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (holding that nursing
home was not liable for failing to inform patient's husband of his or his wife's potential eligibility for
Medicaid benefits).
179. Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, State Abortion Counseling Policies and the Funda-
mental Principles of Informed Consent, 10 GUTTMACHER POL'Y REV. (Fall 2007).
180. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1986),
overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Planned
Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1020 (1st Cir. 1981) (noting that while infor-
mation about the availability of adoption and public benefits does not "bear[] directly on any medical-
ly relevant factor" and so does not "fit[] easily within the traditional ambit of informed consent," it
may be material to a woman's decision and therefore bears a reasonable relation to the state's inter-
est).
181. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883; see also Thomas L. Jipping, Informed Consent to Abortion: A Refine-
ment, 38 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 329, 384-85 (1987) (noting that the heart of the informed consent re-
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Another context in which information about social support re-
sources might reasonably be offered is in the context of prenatal genetic
testing for disability. As noted in Part III.B.2 above, some commentators
have suggested that patients be offered information about disability-
related support resources even before they are tested for genetic anoma-
lies." However, such proposals have not been implemented.
IV. ADDRESSING CONCERNS AND PROPOSING LIMITATIONS
From the perspective of medical ethics, the informed consent pro-
cess ought to be designed in a way that furthers patients' autonomy in
the sphere of medical decision-making. Furthering autonomy requires
recognizing the patient's goals and values, and providing the patient with
the information needed to make a coherent decision in accordance with
these goals and values. And because patients' treatment preferences are
influenced not only by medical factors, but also by social, financial, and
other factors, an ethically-sound doctrine of informed consent ought, in
theory, to incorporate these types of disclosures as well.
Achieving this ethical ideal is challenging, however. It is for this rea-
son that neither legal standards nor standards of medical practice typical-
ly require physicians to satisfy this ambitious goal. Even the staunchest
supporters of patient autonomy recognize that pragmatic and policy con-
siderations may necessitate a narrowing of informed consent from its
broadest possible scope' 8 3-- particularly given that expanding the scope
of informed consent would in turn expose physicians to broader tort lia-
bility risk. It is, however, possible to construct a disclosure obligation that
strikes a fair balance between recognizing patients' needs and ensuring
that health care providers are not unduly burdened. This section seeks to
achieve that goal.
A. Identifying Material Information for the Individual Patient
One challenge of the idealized informed consent process is that, if
its goal is to further individual patients' autonomy, a physician must
know what would be material to each individual patient. Legal require-
ments, however, dispense with this consideration, turning instead to the
quirement is materiality to a woman's decision and arguing that states should have the freedom to re-
quire disclosure of "[n]on-medical information, or medical information relating to non-medical fac-
tors" because such information may "be highly relevant, even vitally important" to a woman's deci-
sion). Again, while the Casey decision was decided on constitutional grounds, it effectively set broader
boundaries on what is permissible as part of the informed consent process.
182. Emens, supra note 147, at 1416-17.
183. Jay Katz notes that there are "sharp distinctions between the legal doctrine, as promulgated
by judges, and the idea of informed consent, based on a commitment to individual self-determination."
KATz, supra note 1, at xliii. In discussing the court's opinion in Canterbury, for example, he comments
that "[t]he strong commitment to self-determination at the beginning of the opinion gets weaker as the
opinion moves from jurisprudential theory to the realities of hospital and courtroom life." Id. at 71-72;
see also Schuck, supra note 30, at 903-05 (revisiting the "informed consent gap" between informed
consent idealists and realists).
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standard of what a "reasonable patient" would find material, rather than
any individual patient's subjective perspective. Many commentators have
criticized the law's approach here, arguing that it effectively negates the
right of individual self-determination." As noted by Evelyn Tenenbaum
in an article about the objective causation element of informed consent,
requiring patients to prove that the undisclosed information would have
caused a reasonable patient to pursue a different course of treatment is
"'unfaithful"' to the underlying autonomy-based ideals of informed con-
sent.' This criticism is equally applicable to disclosure standards that are
based on the needs of the reasonable patient.
While this criticism may be correct from an ethical perspective, legal
and practical principles (out of necessity) require something more easily
applicable. One concern with allowing breach (and, per Tenenbaum,
causation) to be defined by reference to the needs and expectations of
each individual patient is that patients' subsequent legal claims would be
subject to self-serving hindsight bias. A second concern is one of judicial
economy, which looks with skepticism at evaluating each informed con-
sent case on the basis of each individual patient's needs. Finally, from a
practical perspective, modern medical care does not allow physicians the
time needed to form extensive relationships with patients that allow
them to tailor disclosure to the patient's particular needs. It seems rea-
sonable that, if some narrowing of the doctrine of disclosure is necessary,
the objective patient standard may be a good place to start. And indeed,
because most of tort law is based on the expectations and obligations of
the "reasonable person," narrowing disclosures to information that is
material to the reasonable patient would be entirely consistent with exist-
ing tort law principles.186
However, while the content of the standard informed consent dis-
closure may justifiably be limited to information considered material by
the reasonable patient, different standards might apply where a physician
is put on notice that a particular patient requires additional information.
For example, a patient who asks the physician to disclose risks that are
184. See, e.g., FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 305-06 (noting that standards that may be
appropriate for legal and institutional policies will omit some information relevant to patients; suggest-
ing that a subjective standard is more in line with the principles underlying informed consent); KATZ,
supra note 1, at 76-77 (noting that Canterbury's adoption of a reasonable patient standard set aside
issues of subjective self-determination).
185. Evelyn M. Tenenbaum, Revitalizing Informed Consent and Protecting Patient Autonomy: An
Appeal to Abandon Objective Causation, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 697, 717-19 (2012); see also Scott v. Brad-
ford, 606 P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1979) ("To the extent the plaintiff, given an adequate disclosure, would
have declined the proposed treatment, and a reasonable person in similar circumstances would have
consented, a patient's right of self-determination is irrevocably lost. This basic right to know and de-
cide is the reason for the full-disclosure rule.").
186. Limiting disclosures to those considered material by the reasonable patient, however, still
leaves open the question of whether the "reasonable patient" should be narrowed to "reasonable fe-
male patient," the "reasonable Jehovah's Witness patient," the "reasonable Hispanic patient." See
generally Dayna Bowen Matthew, Race, Religion, and Informed Consent-Lessons from Social Sci-
ence, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 150, 161-62 (2008) (discussing varying needs and expectations for in-
formed consent among patients who are members of ethnic, religious, and racial minorities).
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extremely unlikely (and therefore might not be disclosed in the standard
informed consent conversation) but that would be particularly relevant
to the patient's life circumstances-possible nerve injury to the hand of a
violinist, for example--might have a justifiable cause of action based on
lack of informed consent. Current jurisprudence may not establish an af-
firmative duty of inquiry into the patients' particular needs and life cir-
cumstances, as recommended by Robert Gatter," but it seems clear that
physicians may have additional duties to patients who request infor-
mation beyond that which would be considered material to a reasonable
patient.
B. Limitations of Physicians' Knowledge and Expertise
A second potential limitation on a broadened understanding of in-
formed consent is that some of the information that patients might con-
sider material may be beyond the scope of the physician's expertise or
knowledge. For example, physicians often do not know how much a pro-
cedure will cost-either as a general matter, or how much it will cost out-
of-pocket to a particular patient after taking into account insurance cov-
erage. Likewise, discussing the legal or social implications of a treatment,
as discussed in Part III.B.2, is likely outside the average physician's scope
of expertise, and certainly far beyond what most physicians learn in med-
ical school.
One of the primary goals of the informed consent obligation is to
correct an information asymmetry between physician and patient, an
asymmetry that is made even starker by the physician's position of pow-
er." It is precisely because physicians are uniquely qualified to provide
some types of information relevant to a patient's decision, and that they
have shared bodies of professional knowledge and modes of reasoning,8 9
that we impose upon them a legal and ethical duty to share information
with patients." As noted in Canterbury,
The average patient has little or no understanding of the medical
arts, and ordinarily has only his physician to whom he can look for
187. Gatter, supra note 123, at 579, 582.
188. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 305 ("[T]he reality of informed consent in clinical
medicine and research is that a patient or subject cannot usually achieve substantial understanding
without the aid of the professional(s) seeking consent. . . . [It is the] "most efficient--and, often, the
only-way for the person to achieve an adequate understanding."); Franklin G. Miller & Alan
Wertheimer, Preface to a Theory of Consent Transactions: Beyond Valid Consent, in THE ETHics OF
CONSENT THEORY, supra note 22, at 95 (noting that the asymmetry of information exists in medical
contexts is such that patients have no fair opportunity to self-inform at a reasonable cost); Claudia E.
Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L. J. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 10-11, 30) (arguing that
the distinctive characteristic of a profession is its knowledge-based character, and noting the asym-
metry of information between physicians and patients). But see Schuck, supra note 30, at 928-31
(comparing patients and consumers; noting that while sometimes there are greater inequalities be-
tween physicians and patients than between sellers and consumers, the argument from information
and power disparity is not as strong as many believe).
189. Haupt, supra note 188, at 12.
190. This is especially so given that the informed consent obligation is one that is imposed on the
medical provider himself, not the health care institution that employs or contracts with the provider.
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enlightenment with which to reach an intelligent decision. From
these almost axiomatic considerations springs the need, and in turn
the requirement, of a reasonable divulgence by physician to patient
to make such a decision possible."'
If the doctrine of informed consent is premised on physician knowledge
and expertise, then it seems difficult to justify the expansion of this doc-
trine to require a physician to disclose information she does not have,
cannot easily obtain, or lacks competence to evaluate.192
Limiting legally required informed consent disclosures to infor-
mation that is both material to patients and within the physician's unique
expertise might result in a set of disclosure requirements quite different
from the ones set by modern common law and legislation. In many ways,
the range of required disclosures may become broader.
Most notably, many of the physician-specific disclosures highlighted
in Part III.A would be captured by a rule requiring disclosure of matters
within the physician's unique qualifications and knowledge. Only the
physician knows about her financial conflicts of interest, her level of ex-
perience with a procedure, her substance abuse problems, and her reli-
gious affiliation. If a reasonable patient considers this information mate-
rial to a medical decision, she simply has no other choice but to rely on
the physician's voluntary disclosure.193 However, with the exception of
some information about physicians' financial conflicts of interests and
health risks, American law does not generally require disclosure of phy-
sician-specific characteristics as part of the informed consent process?
Another category of disclosures that might be captured by this view
of informed consent would be information about the nonphysiological
social implications of a procedure. For example, a patient with kidney
failure who is learning about long-term dialysis would certainly want to
know that it requires a commitment to be treated in a dialysis center
three times a week for three to four hours per treatment. This infor-
mation is material, in part, because the patient needs to understand that
her work schedule will likely need to be adjusted if she chooses to pursue
long-term dialysis. That said, this information might not be required un-
der an interpretation of medical materiality that is limited to physiologi-
cal risks and benefits. Rather, it tells her about the likely implications of
191. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see also Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1,
9 (Cal. 1972) (offering as a rationale for informed consent doctrine the fact that "patients are generally
persons unlearned in the medical sciences and therefore, except in rare cases, courts may safely as-
sume the knowledge of patient and physician are not in parity").
192. See Haupt, supra note 188, at 46 (arguing that the professional community's body of
knowledge ought to define the scope of the informed consent duty).
193. Of course, a well-informed patient could affirmatively ask for the information she deems
material. However, putting the burden of request on patients runs the risk of striating disclosures
among patient populations based on their prior experience with the health care system and their un-
derstanding of what kind of question should be asked. See Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255, 1259
(Pa. 2001) (noting that materiality of the information disclosed "does not shift depending on how in-
quisitive or passive the particular patient is").
194. See generally supra Part 1II.A.
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the treatment on her lifestyle--essential information, to be sure, but un-
related to the treatment's physiological consequences.
For another example, consider patients whose prognosis or treat-
ment is likely to result in a physical disability--e.g., amputation, blind-
ness, living with a colostomy bag. A host of empirical research demon-
strates that people are notoriously bad at predicting what life with a
disability would be like; most people overestimate the amount of discom-
fort, anxiety, and lifestyle changes that come with a disability.195 Physi-
cians who treat such patients, however, often have a better understand-
ing of how people with disabilities live their lives and may be uniquely
situated to share this kind of information with patients with inaccurate
perspectives on disability. In an article arguing for "framing disability" in
a new way, law professor Elizabeth Emens suggests that parents under-
going prenatal genetic testing also be presented with accurate infor-
mation about how a child's disability might affect their lives.196 Providing
"up-to-date information on the life opportunities and life expectancy for
various disabilities," 97 for example, "could help dispel misconceptions
about living with these disabilities and help prospective parents contex-
tualize medical information, which tends to focus exclusively on the par-
ticular problems associated with a disability.""
That said, some disclosures that have been advocated by commenta-
tors or have been imposed legislatively would fall outside the scope of in-
formed consent under a physician-knowledge standard. Most notably, in-
formation about the cost of medical treatment would be excluded, except
in those specialties where physicians do have access to cost information
or are able to set their own costs. Likewise, while some commentators
have suggested that physicians disclose information about the social, eth-
ical, legal, and privacy implications of medical treatment, these too
would not be required (perhaps with the exception of information about
the consequences of living with a disability or the medical impact of a
treatment on third parties, when offered by physicians with experience in
these matters).'" Finally, physicians would not be obligated to disclose
information about social support resources (like information about the
availability of adoption resources, crisis pregnancy centers, and financial
assistance) that some legislatures have adopted in the abortion context.
195. See, e.g., Jodi Halpern & Robert M. Arnold, Affective Forecasting: An Unrecognized Chal-
lenge in Making Serious Health Decisions, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1709-10 (2008).
196. Emens, supra note 147.
197. Id. at 1417.
198. Id. at 1415. As an example of this, Emens cites the 2008 Prenatally and Postnatally Diag-
nosed Conditions Awareness Act, which "aims to help provide prospective parents who receive a posi-
tive prenatal (or postnatal) diagnosis of Down syndrome or other conditions with "up-to-date infor-
mation on the range of outcomes for individuals living with the diagnosed condition, including
physical, developmental, educational, and psychosocial outcomes."' Id. (citing Prenatally and Postna-
tally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, Pub. L. No. 110-374, 122 Stat. 4051 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 280G-8 (2012)). However, as Emens notes, the Act would require disclosure after the point of diag-
nosis, not before testing. Id.
199. See Haupt, supra note 188, at 14 (arguing that "[njo amount of specialized training ... by
itself makes a professional more competent to render value judgments").
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Essentially, any information beyond what the physician learned in medi-
cal school, in practice, or concerns her personal characteristics would be
excluded under a physician-knowledge-based standard of informed con-
sent.20
C. Policy Limitations
If we accept the physician-expertise based disclosure model, critics
are likely to argue that the expansive nature of this principle, particularly
with respect to physicians' personal characteristics, renders it too broad.
For example, the average patient might wish to know how much sleep a
surgeon has had before consenting to an operation, but few commenta-
tors have argued that these kinds of facts ought to be required as part of
informed consent. Indeed, while an idealized version of patient autono-
my would require such disclosures, there are legitimate policy reasons
why we might not want to extend the legal requirement of informed con-
sent that far.201
1. Physician Privacy
Some facts that are uniquely known to the physician may be
deemed to be too personal for disclosure.20 These may include the physi-
cian's disability status, her personal habits, her religious beliefs, and re-
cent personal trauma. Such information, it could be argued, falls within
the private sphere of a physician's life, and even patients ought not have
access to it without the physician's consent. In contrast, information
about experience levels or success rates with a particular procedure may
be understood as more directly related to the physician's medical prac-
tice; likewise, information about financial conflicts of interest might be
deemed publicly-accessible enough that it ought to be disclosed. Many
would argue that physicians entering medical practice should be entitled
to a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to their personal af-
fairs-or at the very least, should not be required to disclose their pri-
200. In cases where the physician knowledge community itself does not know information that
would be material to the reasonable patient (cost information, for example), one might consider im-
posing a duty to refer patients to other sources of information. While discussion of this issue is beyond
the scope of this Article, note that the establishment of such an affirmative referral duty might also
pose liability risks. Nadia N. Sawicki, Informed Consent Beyond the Physician-Patient Encounter: Tort
Law Implications of Extra-Clinical Decision Support Tools, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 5 (2012); Nadia
N. Sawicki, Patient Protection and Decision-Aid Quality: Regulatory and Tort Law Approaches, 54
ARIZ. L. REv. 621, 642 (2012).
201. In limited cases, there might also be constitutional limitations on extending the doctrine too
broadly. See Albany Urology Clinic, P.C. v. Cleveland, 528 S.E.2d 777,782 & n.19 (Ga. 2000) (discuss-
ing vagueness concerns); Bobinski, supra note 12, at 333 (discussing First Amendment limitations);
Nadia N. Sawicki, Fictions, Facts, and Open Questions: Informed Consent as Compelled Professional
Speech, WASH. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 5).
202. See Whiteside v. Lukson, 947 P.2d 1263,1265 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (expressing concern that
broadening the informed consent duty would require disclosure of "the physician's own health, finan-
cial situation, even medical school grades"); Heinemann, supra note 9, at 1090-94 (discussing privacy
concerns).
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vate information as a matter of law. Even politicians and other public
figures, whose personal lives often end up in the news, are not required
by law to share deeply personal information, despite its potential rele-
vance to voters2 3
That said, the boundaries of what physician-specific information
should be deemed too private for mandatory disclosure are unclear; a
more careful and nuanced analysis of this issue is surely necessary.2 04
However, for the purposes of this Article, it will suffice to recognize that
some limitations ought to be placed on physician-specific disclosure in
light of reasonable concerns about personal privacy.
2. Long- Term Impact on Patient Care
In addition to privacy concerns likely to be expressed by physicians,
there are a host of utilitarian concerns about the long-term implications
of sharing certain types of information, particularly relating to physician
experience. As many commentators have already recognized, requiring
physicians to affirmatively disclose their level of expertise or their suc-
cess rates with a given treatment will likely result in shifting patient
loads.2 05 Patients with the ability to choose among different providers
may flock to more experienced physicians, who will have heavy patient
loads, while less experienced providers may find themselves without
enough patients to develop the experience they need to advance in their
fields. Thus, affirmative disclosure of experience levels will make it diffi-
cult for newer providers (or those hoping to learn how to perform new
procedures) to develop their knowledge, and ultimately may result in
fewer experienced physicians overall. A related concern is that the dis-
tribution of patients among providers is likely to be stratified in unjust
ways. For example, patients of low socio-economic status, patients with
serious illness requiring immediate treatment, and those whose insurance
203. One exception to this relates to disclosures of financial conflicts of interest by political fig-
ures and elected officials.
204. Some might argue that it is not necessary to include information about physician characteris-
tics within the informed consent disclosure duty. Much physician-specific information (about their
habits, their disability status, their financial conflicts) is material to patients only because of the con-
cern that these characteristics will lead to poor medical outcomes-for example, a physician who is
paid as a consultant to a pharmaceutical company might prescribe that drug rather than a more appro-
priate one. If this is the case, critics argue, then it is not clear why the informed consent cause of action
is even necessary. Patients who are injured by physician error will be able to sue for malpractice re-
gardless of the reason for the error; the nondisclosure of a characteristic that one might reasonably
expect to impair physician performance alone should not be enough to impose liability. However, I
would counter that the informed consent cause of action is indeed important for patients who are una-
ble to succeed on a traditional malpractice claim. Perhaps the patient suffered an adverse outcome
because her physician prescribed a medication that she had financial ties to, but a jury is unconvinced
that this prescription actually fell outside the standard of care. The patient, while ultimately unsuccess-
ful in her malpractice claim, may nevertheless have a reason to pursue an informed consent claim, and
this claim may be more successful.
205. See, e.g., Bobinski, supra note 12, at 333-35; Heinemann, supra note 9, at 1003-06; William
Nelson & Paul B. Hoffman, Commentary, Physician Experience as a Measure of Competency: Implica-
tions for Informed Consent, 5 CAMBRIDGE Q. OF HEALTHCARE ETHics 458,460 (1996).
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limits their access to providers may find themselves with less access to
more-favored physicians, and might in turn have worse outcomes.
Another concern about requiring disclosure of success rates in par-
ticular is that this may lead providers to select patients in a way that dis-
favors the most critical cases. 2 0 A physician who currently takes on spe-
cialty patients with significant risk factors, for example, may choose to
limit her practice to "easier" patients if her statistical outcomes in treat-
ing a high-risk population are lower than those of her peers who choose
less risky patients. This, again, raises justice concerns about the impact
on patients.
It is not clear to what extent these risks would actually manifest
themselves if informed consent disclosure duties were expanded to in-
clude information about experience and success rates. But any proposal
to expand disclosure obligations should certainly consider these risks,
and ideally monitor the impact of the new disclosures on patient care in
the long term.21
3. Patient Misunderstanding
Another common argument for limiting some types of disclosures
(particularly with respect to success rates) is that the average patient may
not be qualified to understand and logically make use of this infor-
mation.208 This concern has been raised in the context of websites and
public reporting mechanisms, like Hospital Compare, that provide empir-
ical data about quality measures like readmission rates, surgical compli-
cations, and healthcare-associated infections. 2" Some critics have argued
that the empirical information provided is simply not useful to patients,
in part because patients do not understand the information or cannot in-
terpret it in useful ways. For those who (rightly) view an ethical informed
consent doctrine as requiring not just mere disclosure, but also under-
standing, this concern is certainly important.
A significant problem with this line of argument, however, is that it
has been uniformly rejected as a matter of law. Regardless of ethical ob-
ligations, American law emphasizes disclosure and not understanding-
in part because of how difficult it is for adjudicators to evaluate whether
a patient has substantially understood a disclosure, and in part because of
206. See generally Kristin Madison, The Law and Policy of Health Care Quality Reporting, 31
CAMPBELL L. REV. 215, 215 (2008) (noting similar risks associated with public reporting of provider
and institutional quality information).
207. Another concern about the impact of disclosure on patient care might be raised in the con-
text of disclosure of cost information. If physicians were expected to know and disclose the actual cost
of procedures to individual patients, that would require knowledge of the patients' insurance status,
and might have a discriminatory effect on patients.
208. Jay Katz references the claim that "[flrom doctors' point of view, since patients cannot be
trusted to comprehend medicine's esoteric knowledge sufficiently well, [inviting their participation in
medical decision making] does not make sense." KATZ, supra note 1, at 91. However, Katz rejects this
argument. "All professions possess esoteric knowledge ... [but that] does not necessarily suggest,
however, that this knowledge cannot be communicated to, or understood by, patients." Id. at 92.
209. See Madison, supra note 206, at 218-36.
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the belief that more information is always valuable to consumers. In Vir-
ginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, for
example, a First Amendment case about a Virginia law that prohibited
pharmacists from advertising drug prices, the Supreme Court held that
keeping the public in ignorance based on the fear that they will make
poor choices is not a valid reason for suppressing speech.2 10 While state
actors' suppression of speech is clearly different from the establishment
of common law informed consent requirements, cases like Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy are instructive because they demonstrate that even if
a recipient of information does not respond to it in the thoughtful way
envisioned by the speaker, that information still has value. This principle
is also reflected in the lengthy disclosures required by law for financial
transactions, product sales, and the like. An entire body of American
regulatory law has developed to identify the information that needs to be
shared with consumers before they enter into a transaction, with almost
no consideration for whether the average consumer is likely to under-
stand this information, let alone read it.2 '
D. Injury Causation as Mediating Concerns About Excessive Liability
Critics may worry that expanding physician's disclosure duties to in-
clude material but nonmedical information would broaden the scope of
physician liability too far. These concerns are unwarranted, however, as
the doctrine of injury causation sets a reasonable limit on liability in such
contexts.
As noted above, a patient who demonstrates that her physician
breached a duty to disclose cannot prevail on an informed consent claim
unless she satisfies a two-pronged standard of causation unique in the
world of tort law. Decision causation requires a plaintiff to prove that,
had a reasonable patient been informed of the undisclosed fact, she more
likely than not would have made a different treatment decision.212 In a
sense, the decision causation requirement is closely tied to the materiali-
ty standard for identifying duty and breach-information is material and
needs to be disclosed if it would be likely to affect a reasonable patient's
decision.
However, even if a plaintiff demonstrates that the reasonable pa-
tient would have undergone a different medical treatment had she
known of the undisclosed fact, she will only be successful in her claim if
she also proves that the undisclosed fact more likely than not caused the
210. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); see
also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) ("The First Amendment directs us
to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government
perceives to be their own good.").
211. But see, for example, Senator Elizabeth Warren's push to make credit card and loan agree-
ments more readable. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Remarks by Elizabeth Warren on
The CARD Act (Feb. 22, 2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/
Pages/tgl074.aspx.
212. Twerski & Cohen, supra note 9, at 9.
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injury. This requirement is commonly referred to as injury causation. The
secondary requirement of injury causation is closely tied to the doctrine
of proximate causation (also known as legal causation), which allows re-
covery only if an injury actually occurs and the negligent act's causal
connection to an injury is close enough to justify liability.2"
Notably, many of the expanded disclosures described above-cost,
impact on third parties, physician characteristics, etc.-involve risks that
do not manifest themselves as clearly as traditional medical risks. For ex-
ample, even if a court were willing to find that a physician has a duty to
disclose her history of professional discipline, it is unclear how this risk
would manifest itself in a compensable injury. Any injury the patient suf-
fers as a result of treatment would have to be closely tied enough to the
physician's undisclosed disciplinary history to satisfy injury causation.2 14
This determination would be highly context specific, and in many cases
might be difficult to prove. If a physician had previously been disciplined
for sexually assaulting patients during invasive procedures, then a patient
who was sexually assaulted during such a procedure might be able to re-
cover under informed consent (again, assuming a court is willing to ac-
cept a broadened disclosure duty). But if the patient suffered another,
more common, kind of injury-like a physical complication associated
the procedure-her claim would be unsuccessful for want of injury cau-
sation. Likewise, a physician who suffers from alcohol abuse might have
a duty to disclose this fact, but the patient will not be able to recover un-
der informed consent unless a harm actually arose that is causally related
to the alcohol abuse.
The disclosure of cost information and financial conflicts of interest
raises similar concerns. A patient who successfully argued that her physi-
cian had a duty to disclose the cost of a procedure might conceivably be
able to recover if she suffers medical bankruptcy, but would not be able
to recover for any physical harms caused by the performance of the pro-
cedure. Likewise, a patient who was not informed of a physician's finan-
cial conflict of interest but did not suffer medical harm as a result of the
physician's recommended treatment would have very limited recovery
opportunities available. For example, consider Moore, where the patient
was asked by his physician to travel for the collection of blood and tissue
samples to which he might not have consented had he been aware of his
physician's financial interests."' The injuries Moore suffered as a result
of his physician's breach were both dignitary and financial in nature. 2 16
Conceivably, Moore might have been able to recover the economic costs
associated with the treatment to which he would have otherwise not con-
213. Id. at 9-11.
214. See, e.g., Jalowitz v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 691 N.W.2d 926 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (deny-
ing patient's claim that she was not informed of restrictions on physicians' operating privilege in an-
other state, where patient did not demonstrate that "the undisclosed risk of complications from the
surgery performed by McEnany actually materialized").
215. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 481 (Cal. 1990).
216. Id. at 488-93.
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sented,217 or even economic benefits from the sale of his cell line that he
might have negotiated had his physician been honest about the financial
implications of the treatment.218
Because the category of injuries for which patients might be able to
recover under a doctrine of expanded informed consent would likely be
narrow, concerns about excessive liability for physicians are unwarrant-
ed. That said, critics of expanded disclosure duties would be justified in
their opposition if they could show that some of the disclosures proposed
in Part III would never lead to an associated injury. As noted by the
court in Canterbury v. Spence, if an unrevealed risk does not actually ma-
terialize, "the omission, however unpardonable, is legally without conse-
quence." 2 1 9 If a physician fails to disclose that she is a Democrat, for ex-
ample, what causally-related and legally-compensable injury could a pa-
patient possibly suffer? Certainly, a patient would not suffer any physical
harm as a result of being treated by a physician with an opposing political
perspective, and any claim for emotional distress on these grounds would
fail given the narrowness of the tort doctrine of negligent infliction of
emotional distress.
Tort law defines duty by reference to foreseeable risk and the pre-
cautions that need to be taken to avoid it.2 20 If there is no foreseeable risk
from failing to disclose a particular fact, then there can be no duty and no
breach. Consequently, some of the categories of disclosure described
above, while arguably material to some reasonable patients, would be
excluded from disclosure on the grounds that they will never cause a
compensable harm.
V. CONCLUSION
Although modernizing the doctrine of informed consent to require
disclosure of information that falls outside the scope of medical material-
ity would better reflect modern understandings of how patients actually
217. See Gragg v. Calandra, 696 N.E.2d 1282, 1286 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (holding that Illinois law
provides a mechanism for recovering "wrongfully caused medical expenses" associated with treatment
to which the patient did not consent).
218. See SKLOOT,supra note 175, at 202-03 (discussing Ted Slavin's sale of his blood serum in the
1970s). Note also that even in the absence of direct harm to the plaintiff, a restitutionary remedy of
disgorgement might be available were the cause of action framed as a breach of fiduciary duty. See
generally Deborah A. DeMott, Causation in the Fiduciary Realm, 91 BOsTON U. L. REV. 851, 852
(2011).
219. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Note, however, that many com-
mentators have questioned the merits of requiring actual injury in informed consent cases, arguing
that breaches of informed consent should be compensable on the basis of dignitary harm alone. See,
e.g., Alan Meisel, A "Dignitary Tort" as a Bridge between the Idea of Informed Consent and the Law of
Informed Consent, 16 J. L., MED. & HEALTH CARE 210 (1988); Alan J. Weisbard, Informed Consent:
The Law's Uneasy Compromise with Ethical Theory, 65 NEB. L. REV. 749, 763-64 (1986) (arguing for
"viewing patient self-determination as a goal independent of the avoidance of physical injury and sep-
arate from the legal apparatus of medical malpractice," and proposing a schedule of recovery for dig-
nitary harm in informed consent cases).
220. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3
(2010).
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make medical decisions, such a change would represent a dramatic doc-
trinal shift. While few practicing physicians would advocate for the ex-
pansion of informed consent liability, policymakers, scholars, and patient
advocates have signaled that such an expansion may be necessary. Thus,
it is essential to develop an ethically sound, legally justifiable, and practi-
cally feasible doctrine of informed consent that incorporates some non-
medical disclosures that patients consider relevant to their medical
choices.
This Article argues that an ideal model would require physicians to
disclose any information they are uniquely qualified to provide that
would be material to a reasonable patient's decision about what kind of
medical treatment to pursue. Disclosures based on the physician's
knowledge and expertise would include not only information about the
physiological consequences of treatment and nontreatment, but also
some information known to the physician personally about her own
characteristics (such as her experience, conflicts of interest, health status,
etc.). Physicians' specialized knowledge might also include information
about the practical implications of living with a disability; medical impli-
cations for third parties; and, in some areas of practice where this infor-
mation is readily known, the cost of treatment.
That said, this broadened body of information potentially subject to
disclosure may need to be limited for pragmatic and policy reasons. For
example, some physician-specific information might be deemed too per-
sonal for disclosure. Disclosure of information about a provider's quality
statistics might lead to patient cherry picking and have a negative impact
on the health care system overall. Discussion of the precise boundaries of
these potential limitations, unfortunately, is beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle.
Notably, the model of expanded disclosure proposed herein would
exclude many categories of information that some commentators believe
ought to be disclosed. These include privacy-infringing, physician-specific
disclosures; disclosures about the cost of most treatments; information
about the social, ethical, legal, and privacy implications of treatment; and
information about social services and other supportive resources that are
currently required by many state statutes in the abortion context.
If advocates for disclosure of these types of information are correct
that such information is material to patients' medical decision-making,
how do we ensure that we strike the appropriate balance between sup-
porting patient autonomy and ensuring that providers are not subject to
undue liability?
Consider the cost of treatment, for example. Because most physi-
cians do not know how much any patient will actually pay for a given
treatment, information about the cost of care would fall outside the
scope of required disclosures under the model described above. That
said, patients have very legitimate reasons for wanting to know cost in-
formation before making medical decisions; excluding cost information
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from the realm of informed consent disclosure means that patients will
have to make difficult medical decisions without the facts needed to en-
sure that these decisions are consistent with their goals and values. But if
our aspiration is to get cost information into the hands of patients so that
they can make better-informed treatment decisions, we must recognize
that there are ways of accomplishing this goal without imposing addi-
tional liability burdens on individual physicians. For example, some
states have established institutional disclosure mandates requiring hospi-
tals to provide transparent information to patients about the costs of
common treatments.22 ' Alternatively, states could themselves collect cost
information from insurers and share it with consumers via all-payer
claims databases. 2 2 Both of these options would achieve the goal of in-
forming patients without subjecting individual physicians to liability for
nondisclosure of information that is outside their expertise.
In the health care context, we are somewhat hamstrung by a history
which has situated the locus of disclosure within the physician's sphere.
But this historical fact does not mean that some disclosure duties related
to the provision of health care services might not be better situated at the
institutional or governmental level. As in many other consumer protec-
tion contexts, states may have valid and compelling reasons for requiring
service providers (here, physicians) to disclose various types of infor-
mation to consumers (here, consumers of medical care). But these rea-
sons are different in kind than the reasons underlying the ethical and le-
gal doctrines of informed consent. Informed consent is a commori law
doctrine grounded in the ethical obligations of medical professionals to
correct for the information imbalance between patients and physicians,
and to ensure autonomous patient decision-making. In contrast, state-
mandated disclosure requirements may be aimed at achieving regulatory
goals extrinsic to medical profession, such as correcting for market fail-
ures. Disentangling these two sources of disclosure duties is important
for making sure that patients have access to information that may be ma-
terial to their treatment decisions, while ensuring that physicians are not
unduly burdened by the threat of civil liability for failure to disclose in-
formation that is not central to the practice of medicine.
Finally, it is important to note that disclosure alone is not a pana-
cea.m2 As many scholars of health law and medical ethics have recog-
221. See CATALYST FOR PAYMENT REFORM & HEALTH CARE INCENTIVES IMPROVEMENT INST.,
REPORT CARD ON STATE PRICE TRANSPARENCY LAWS (Mar. 2014). In 2013, Congress proposed a
health care price transparency law that would require such state mandates; however, it has not been
passed. Health Care Price Transparency Promotion Act, H.R. 1326, 113th Cong. (2013). The Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act takes a similar approach at the federal level, requiring hospitals
to provide the public with access to information about standard charges for certain services. Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, § 2718 (2010); see also Federal
Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled, 42 C.F.R. H§ 405.500-405.535 (2014).
222. See CATALYST FOR PAYMENT REFORM, supra note 221.
223. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 647 (2011) for an excellent review of the arguments against mandated disclosure in the in-
formed consent context and beyond.
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nized, the mere provision of information during the informed consent
process does not guarantee that patients will understand and be able to
take advantage of that information. Consumer protection advocates rec-
ognize that excessive disclosures may overwhelm patients and leave them
struggling to distinguish between relevant and less-relevant facts. And
some providers may view disclosure and consent requirements as a way
to sanitize or excuse inappropriate care-as, for example, where signifi-
cant financial conflicts of interest cause a physician to provide treatment
that jeopardizes patient safety. While these concerns are worth exploring
further, the fact remains that American law imposes on physicians an af-
firmative duty to ensure informed consent. Ambiguity as to the bounda-
ries of required disclosure makes it extremely difficult for physicians to
satisfy their legal and ethical duties and protect themselves from liability.
The doctrine of informed consent was originally developed as a
means for furthering patients' decisional autonomy. However, the type
of information that is available to patients and relevant to their informed
decisions in the twenty-first century is dramatically different than the in-
formation that was available and relevant a half-century ago. Recogniz-
ing these changes at a broader level promises to modernize the doctrine
of informed consent; and expanding tort law's understanding of material-
ity in medical decision-making is central to this mission.
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